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This paper presents a framework that captures how the social nature of agents that are situated
in a multi-agent environment impacts upon their individual mental states.Roles and social relationships
provide an abstraction upon which we develop the notion of social mental shaping.This allows us to
extend the standard Belief-Desire-Intention model to account for how common social phenomena (e.g.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Agent-based computing is rapidly gaining acceptance as a pervasive and power-
ful model for analysing, designing and implementing a wide range of software systems
(Jennings 2000).The paradigm is based upon the notion of an agent as an autonomous,
internally-motivated entity that is situated within a dynamic and not entirely predictable
environment from which it receives perceptual inputs and to which it effects changes by
performing actions (Franklin and Graesser 1997).The fact that agents are autonomous
means they have a high degree of self-determination: they decide for themselves when
and under what conditions their actions should be performed.Despite this
self-determination, however, agents are often required to attain goals that are only
possible, made easier or satisﬁed more completely by interacting with other, similarly
autonomous, agents.In this context, “interaction” is used as a generic term for a wide
range of inter-agent social behaviour and joint activities, such as cooperation (working
together to achieve a common objective), collaborative problem-solving (going together
through the search space of a problem in order to ﬁnd a joint solution) and nego-
tiation (coming to a mutually acceptable agreement on some matter).All of these
forms of interaction are united by the fact that they are inherently intertwined with
processes of social inﬂuence that agents try to exert upon each other’s decision-making
and behaviour.For example, agents may inﬂuence their acquaintances by trying to make
them endorse some new beliefs or goals, or perform some new individual or inter-agent
activity or abandon/modify some existing activity.In short, it is the existence of an
inﬂuence process that lies at the heart of sociality in agent-based systems.Whereas the
behaviour of an asocial agent is entirely determined by its internal drivers and their
interplay with the physical environment as seen through its percepts, the behaviour of
a social agent can additionally be inﬂuenced by the social interactions in which it is, or
it could be, engaged.
Although the process of inﬂuencing represents the very essence of social interaction,
it has received surprisingly little attention to date.Particular forms of inﬂuence have
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been studied in the context of speciﬁc types of interaction (e.g. cooperation (Grosz and
Kraus 1996; Jennings 1995; Tambe 1997; Werner 1989), coordination (Barbuceanu 1997;
Durfee 1999), collaborative decision-making (Panzarasa et al.2001a) and negotiation
(Kraus et al.1998; Faratin et al.1998)), but, to date, there has been no systematic anal-
ysis of the generic process per se.This is a serious shortcoming and one that this paper
seeks to rectify.To this end, a conceptual framework is presented that indicates how
the process of inﬂuencing works for a broad class of agent models.Speciﬁcally, con-
sideration is given to deliberative agent architectures (Wooldridge and Jennings 1995)
whose decision-making can be viewed in terms of beliefs (what the agent knows about
its world), desires (what the agent wants) and intentions (what the agent is actually
committed to doing).Canonical examples of such Belief-Desire-Intention (BDI) archi-
tectures include IRMA (Bratman et al.1988) and PRS (Georgeff and Lansky 1987).
For such architectures, the mechanisms and structures that enable the social nature
of agenthood to impact upon individual decision-making behaviour are identiﬁed and
characterised.Since the focus is exclusively on cognitive agents that are conceptualised
using an intentional stance (Dennett 1987), the term social mental shaping (Panzarasa
et al.1999) is used to more accurately denote the process of inﬂuence in this case.
In providing a clear conceptual model for how the social nature of agents impacts
upon their individual decision-making behaviour, this work extends the state of the
art in two ways.Firstly, it identiﬁes the fundamental structures and mechanisms that
underpin a wide variety of social interactions in multi-agent systems.Thus it is shown
how the notion of social mental shaping can be used to characterise common forms
of joint behavioural processes such as cooperation, collaborative problem-solving and
negotiation.By identifying the common ground, this paper provides a unifying frame-
work for expressing and analysing the disparate work on formal models of social agency
that has taken place to date.Secondly, by interfacing models of individual and social
behaviour, social mental shaping represents a step towards the goal of producing a com-
prehensive account of collaborative decision-making in multi-agent systems (Panzarasa
et al.2001 a).In this respect, social mental shaping can be regarded as the fundamen-
tal socio-cognitive process that underpins the relationship between micro and macro
practical reasoning and decision-making within a multi-agent environment.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows.Section 2 shows the inadequacy
of the standard BDI model when it comes to sociality.Section 3 informally introduces
the notion of social mental shaping and the key concepts of roles and social relationships
that are central to our model.Section 4 presents the formal framework in which the
model of social mental shaping is expressed (a complete speciﬁcation of the underlying
formal language is given in the Appendix) and Section 5 gives a detailed formalisation
of the model.Section 6 introduces a number of axioms that ensure a degree of con-
sistency in an agent’s mental state in the face of competing social inﬂuences.Section 7
shows the use of social mental shaping in a number of key types of social relationship.
Section 8 describes an experiment in which this notion is applied to a real-world eco-
nomic domain.Finally, Section 9 situates this work within the related literature, and
Section 10 concludes and indicates avenues for future work.
2. THE SOLIPSISTIC NATURE OF EXISTING BDI MODELS
The BDI model has been widely advocated as a conceptual framework for building
intelligent agents (e. g.Bratman et al.1988; Georgeff and Lansky 1987; Mueller 1996)
and many researchers have attempted to capture its key properties in formal models740 Computational Intelligence
(e.g. Cohen and Levesque 1990; Rao and Georgeff 1991; Singh 1995; Wooldridge 2000).
However, all of this work concentrates on an individual agent’s decision-making pro-
cesses; there are no explicit structures for modelling social activities.The main reason
for this limitation is that the mental states of BDI agents are usually viewed as con-
stituted only by internally motivated attitudes.1 To overcome this, and provide a more
complete model of an agent’s behaviour, BDI models need to be extended.In particu-
lar, the mechanisms that capture the social nature of agents and their ability to interact
with one another need to be deﬁned (Carley and Newell 1994).To this end, the ﬁrst
issue to address is how the social nature of agents can impact upon their individual
mental states.Particularly, the following questions must be answered:
• How is an agent’s mental state inﬂuenced by the multi-agent system in which it is
situated?
• What is the relationship between the mental states of interacting agents?
• What are the conceptual mechanisms that enable these relationships to be effected?
Recently, a number of theoretical models have been proposed for extending the
BDI framework to deal with some facets of the questions raised above.In particular,
Castelfranchi (1995) introduces the notion of social commitment, deﬁned as one agent’s
commitment to another to performing a certain action.Castelfranchi then goes on
to argue that this notion is not reducible to the internal commitments of individual
agents or groups of agents, and is thus able to capture the dependence relationships
between agents.Cavedon et al.(1997), on the other hand, use the notion of a social
attitude to reﬂect commitments, persistent over time, to performing a certain action.
Such attitudes are deﬁned as ternary dependence relations between two agents (or
teams),2 with respect to some state of affairs.For example, in the logical framework of
Cavedon et al., SCOMI ai a j    means that agent ai is Intention-committed to agent
aj with respect to   (there are also analogues for beliefs and desires).These social
attitudes capture interactions between agents: speciﬁcally, they convey the idea that an
agent adopts a mental attitude because it is committed to another agent.
While social commitments and social attitudes capture some aspects of the relation-
ships between agents (or teams), they suffer from a number of shortcomings.Firstly,
the social nature of agents can impact upon their individual mental states even without
any form of social commitment between agents to performing actions.For example, an
agent may be persuaded to adopt a mental attitude of another agent’s (Kraus et al.
1998; Parsons et al.1998).Persuasion is a mode of social inﬂuence clearly grounded
upon some form of social interaction, but the agent who adopts a mental attitude as
a result of being persuaded by another was not necessarily committed a priori to that
other agent.Indeed, the former may decide to change its mental state merely on the
basis of its conﬁdence in the latter.
Secondly, neither concept says anything about how an agent’s mental state may be
inﬂuenced whenever it takes on a role in a multi-agent system outside of any particular
social relationship with another agent.Sociality, in its basic forms, is reﬂected not only
by actual interactions between agents, but also by potential ones.These potential inter-
actions between agents may be described and operationalised through the web of inter-
connections that exist between roles within the role structure of a multi-agent system
1Internally motivated mental attitudes are those that an agent would generate for itself if it were completely
unaffected by its social setting.This contrasts with socially motivated attitudes that an agent is led to adopt or to
keep by the very fact that it is situated in a system that contains other agents.
2Cavedon et al.(1997) describe teams as single (higher-order) agents endowed with primitive social attitudes.Social Mental Shaping 741
(see Section 3).A role, by its very nature, is fundamentally a social construct: its enact-
ment implies the enactment of other roles (because all roles are related to at least
one other).Adopting a role may have an impact upon an agent’s mental state simply
because the role implies a set of expectations of the behaviour of the agent.No actual
social relationship between two or more particular agents is necessarily involved in such
role-based sociality.Still, the agent’s mental state is inﬂuenced by its role-based atti-
tude to eventually establish social interactions with others in related roles.For example,
an agent that has adopted the role of secretary may be expected to adopt the goal
of fulﬁlling the boss’s goals whenever required.This can be the case even when there
is no speciﬁc agent occupying the role of boss (i.e., the role is uninstantiated). Thus,
when no actual social relationship is involved, the secretary’s adoption of the new goal
of achieving the boss’s goals when required can be regarded as simply driven by the
adopted secretary role, regardless of the particular agent that will eventually take on
the boss role.
Finally, the social nature of agents can impact upon their mental states even outside
of any actual or potential role-based social relationship.To the extent that agents have
social capabilities and can reason about and represent other agents in intentional terms
(Dennett 1987), their mental apparatus can be changed and/or complemented simply
by internalising others’ mental attitudes.This may happen outside of any actual or
potential social relationship between the agents involved.For example, an agent may
be induced to adopt another agent’s goal, without the latter’s being aware of any social
interaction with the former, and regardless of the speciﬁc role the former occupies.
In the light of the above observations, neither social commitment, nor social atti-
tudes capture the whole impact that the social nature of agents has on their mental
states and behaviour.Given this, an attempt will be made in this paper to overcome
these limitations by providing a uniﬁed framework in which, at a more general level,
the inﬂuence that sociality may have on autonomous agents’ mental states can be inves-
tigated.There are two components to this framework.Firstly, a representation and
formalisation of the agent’s decision-making apparatus through a relatively standard
BDI model (Cohen and Levesque 1990; Panzarasa et al.1999, 2001a; Parsons et al.
1998; Rao and Georgeff 1991; Singh 1995; Wooldridge 2000).Secondly, our framework
is enriched by a characterisation of the structures, mechanisms and principles that inter-
face to the agent’s decision-making apparatus, and that modify it in the light of social
interactions.The notions of roles and types of relationships between roles are used as
the key abstractions in this framework.Informally, a role can be viewed as a kind of
task description (Handy 1993; Huczynski and Buchanan 1991) and a relationship type
as a link between two (or more) roles (see Section 3).For example, Prime Minister,
professor and secretary can all be viewed as roles and the links between them as rela-
tionship types or abstractions.The fact that the Prime Minister and professor roles will
typically involve the exercise of some control over a secretary role gives rise to two
different relationship types.These types can then be variously instantiated by different
agents, bringing about differing social relationships.We choose these notions as our key
abstractions because they provide a high-level and neutral means for modelling sociality.
Furthermore, roles and their relations can be easily expressed in a logical language, and
this represents a ﬁrst step towards an in-depth formalisation of the interplay between
sociality and agent intentionality (Dennett 1987).The next section will informally intro-
duce the notion of social mental shaping and concentrate on deﬁning roles and social
relationships more fully.Sections 4 and 5 will bring these concepts together with the
individual decision-making apparatus to provide a uniﬁed picture of a social agent.742 Computational Intelligence
3. INTRODUCING SOCIAL MENTAL SHAPING
Social mental shaping is concerned with the conceptual mechanisms that describe
how an agent’s beliefs, desires, goals and intentions are inﬂuenced by its social nature.
It is not concerned with the issue of why and when agents are inﬂuenced to adopt
a particular mental attitude.Given this, it is our view that an agent may be socially
motivated to adopt or to keep a mental attitude either by the role(s) it takes on, or
by other agents with which it has social relationships, or simply by other agents outside
of any social relationship. In this respect, the social environment (i.e., roles and other
agents within or outside social relationships) plays an active causal role in governing an
agent’s behaviour, in the same way that the agent’s internally motivated mental attitudes
usually do.An agent’s mental state, therefore, needs to be broadened to account for the
impact that roles and other agents may exert by providing either new socially motivated
mental attitudes or new reasons for maintaining individually motivated attitudes.To do
this, the mechanisms that enable such a broadening effect must be identiﬁed.
A central idea that aids the examination of the nature and functioning of social
mental shaping is that of multi-agent system structure.This notion refers to the way
in which the members of a multi-agent system relate to one another (Huczynski and
Buchanan 1991) and represents one of the basic aspects of system development when
it comes to designing and managing the generation of inter-agent interaction protocols
(Wooldridge et al.2000).When agents come together and interact, various relations
are established between them.More speciﬁcally, the ways agents relate to one another
can be studied and conceptualised in terms of a set of relatively stable patterns of
interactions.System structure is the label we give to these patterns of interactions.
There are as many types of system structures as there are dimensions along which a
multi-agent system can be differentiated and patterns of interactions identiﬁed (e.g.
status, role, power, leadership).However, for the purposes of this paper, we restrict
our attention to the concept of role and, accordingly, to the role structure of a multi-
agent system.A role structure can be deﬁned as the stable pattern of relations that
exist among the roles in a multi-agent system (Huczynski and Buchanan 1991).This
stable pattern of relations between roles provides the foundations for a certain degree
of stability in the ways agents interact with one another.In fact, to some extent, the
behaviour of each agent in a multi-agent system can be regarded as constrained by a set
of expectations regarding the agent’s decision-making and its interactions with the other
members of the system.In turn, these expectations represent the cognitive components
of the notion of social role.Therefore, by providing the agents with a set of expectations
about each other’s behaviour, the role structure can be viewed as a source of relatively
stable patterns of interactions among the agents.
More precisely, the role structure of a multi-agent system can have an impact upon
an agent’s mental state in two main ways.Firstly, adopting a role imposes responsibili-
ties, inﬂuences and constraints upon the role-player since it provides others with a set of
stable expectations of what it will do and how it will respond to them.Speciﬁcally, it pro-
vides the role-player with: (a) a set of expectations about the other role-players’ mental
attitudes and behaviour, and (b) a set of expectations of how the other role-players will
respond to its own mental attitudes and behaviour.Secondly, the role structure of a
multi-agent system may be instantiated by agents who can thus inﬂuence one another
through the social relationships that ﬂow from their interrelated roles.A social rela-
tionship involves at least two related roles occupied by two agents who are aware of the
connection between them.Thus, a social relationship implies the instantiation by two
agents of at least two related roles, while a relation between two roles may, in general,Social Mental Shaping 743
give rise to any number of instantiated social relationships.Each of these perspectives
will now be dealt with in turn.
First, consider the case of adopting a role in a multi-agent system.Social scien-
tists differ in the way in which they use the term “role.” Deﬁnitions depend on how
roles are to be used.We may consider prescriptive, evaluative, descriptive and action
deﬁnitions of the concept of role (Handy 1993; Huczynski and Buchanan 1991).A pre-
scriptive deﬁnition is concerned with what an agent should do when it plays a speciﬁc
role.An evaluative deﬁnition, on the other hand, assesses how a role is being per-
formed.A descriptive deﬁnition of a role is based on the actual duties performed by
the agent being studied.Finally, an action deﬁnition is based on the actions that are per-
formed while pursuing the role duties.However, any role may be considered from any
of these four perspectives.Further, all four views are interrelated and interdependent.
For example, consider the role of secretary.A job description specifying the main duties
(e.g. managing correspondence, taking minutes of meetings) represents an example of
a prescriptive deﬁnition.Such a deﬁnition provides criteria or standards against which
to make assessments of how well the role of secretary is being performed (evaluative
deﬁnition).Further, by observing and noting in detail what an individual does (e. g.how
the secretary spends his or her time), a descriptive deﬁnition of the role of secretary can
be developed.Finally, by observing the actions that are performed in pursuing the role
tasks (e.g. the secretary may speak with colleagues, ask questions, establish a rapport),
an action deﬁnition of secretary can be developed.
For the purposes of this work, however, a new cognitive deﬁnition of the concept
of role is required (see Section 4.3 for more details). Thus, a role is here conceived
of as a system of mental attitudes that an agent may adopt by occupying that role.
This perspective is necessary because roles are viewed as providing agents with much of
the information and many of the goals and other attitudes that drive their behaviour.
Roles inform them of the problems and decisions they face, and possibly how to address
these.For example, a role may inform an agent of where to look for appropriate goals,
informational resources and value premises, how to achieve goals, and how to react to
changes in mental attitudes.Returning to the particular example of a secretary role.
In a business unit, this role may be regarded as leading the role-player to adopt and
be motivated by the goal to contribute to the success of the unit, as well as to adopt
the more speciﬁc goal of drafting routine correspondence.The secretary role can also
provide the agent with some of the information needed to become more familiar with
the task.Likewise, taking on this role may inﬂuence the agent to commit itself to
proceed forthwith to do what any ofﬁcial instruction may require of it.
Differences among agents can, however, substantially affect their behaviour in roles
that are identical from an observer’s standpoint.While we may conceive of an ideal
type of role as a system of attached mental attitudes, the instantiation of roles invari-
ably involves both role-based mental attitudes and internally motivated ones.That is, a
role is a speciﬁcation of some, but not all, of the mental attitudes that drive the role-
player’s behaviour.Many other mental attitudes also underpin the agent’s behaviour,
including idiosyncratic attitudes that reﬂect differences between agents.Adoption of
role-based attitudes may, however, bring about a modiﬁcation of idiosyncratic attitudes.
For example, adopting a goal attached to a role may require the agent to drop an
internally motivated goal which is inconsistent with the role-based one (see Section 6).
Consider, for instance, the case of a manager who believes in and wants to adopt a
relaxed and participative style of behaviour, but whose role expectations lead him or
her to adopt a more formal and directive style of behaviour.In such a situation, com-
pliance with one set of goals makes it difﬁcult or impossible to comply with other goals744 Computational Intelligence
and expectations.The two sets of goals are in conﬂict and create inconsistency.This
inconsistency between socially and internally motivated mental attitudes must be over-
come in order for the agents to behave rationally3 (Cohen and Levesque 1990; Rao and
Georgeff 1991; Simon 1957).
Let us turn now to the inﬂuence that can be exerted upon an agent’s mental state
by other agents and by social relationships.More generally, there are a number of ways
in which agents can inﬂuence one another’s mental states.Some of the main modes of
social inﬂuence that are found in multi-agent systems are:
• Authority.An agent may be inﬂuenced by another to adopt a mental attitude when-
ever the latter is entitled to guide the behaviour of the former (Barnard 1938).
Authority may thus be deﬁned as the power of an agent to guide the behaviour of
another by affecting the latter’s mental state.
• Helping disposition.An agent may be inﬂuenced by another to adopt a mental atti-
tude simply because it intends to contribute to the welfare of the latter.An example
of this is the assumption of benevolence that is present in many of the early dis-
tributed problem-solving systems (Erman et al.1980; Lesser and Corkhill 1983).
• Trust.An agent may be inﬂuenced by another to adopt a mental attitude merely on
the strength of its conﬁdence in the latter, without any critical scrutiny or any review
of the evidential basis (Grifﬁths and Luck 1999; Marsh 1994).
• Persuasion.An agent may be inﬂuenced to adopt another agent’s mental attitude
via a process of argumentation (Kraus et al.1998; Parsons et al.1998; Walton and
Krabbe 1995).In such cases, the adoption of a mental attitude depends upon con-
viction.Suggestions are judged partly on their merits, but partly on the merits of
the agent making them.This is true both because the agents acting upon the rec-
ommendations often do not have the expertise needed to judge them, and because
time constraints require them to accept the recommendations of the agents they
trust (see above).Furthermore, an agent may be persuaded to adopt another agent’s
mental attitude via a process of bargaining or negotiation (Handy 1993; Huczynski
and Buchanan 1991).In this case, an agent may agree with another to adopt one (or
more) of the latter’s mental attitudes in return for desired behaviour.
• Threat.An agent may be threatened to adopt a mental attitude on the basis of
future negative interference or denied help (Kraus et al.1998; Sierra et al.1998).
In the ﬁrst case, an agent may be inﬂuenced by another to adopt a mental attitude
whenever the latter threatens to execute an action that will conﬂict with the former’s
desires, goals or intentions.In the second case, an agent is inﬂuenced by a threat
that another will not act to help the former to fulﬁl its desires, goals or intentions.
This list of the main modes of inﬂuence found in multi-agent systems is meant to
be neither exhaustive nor mutually exclusive.For example, when an agent decides upon
a particular course of action, some of the mental attitudes upon which this decision is
based may have been imposed by the exercise of someone else’s authority, some may
have been the result of helping disposition, and so forth.Moreover, not all modes of
social inﬂuence can be suitably exercised in all circumstances.For example, in the boss-
secretary relationship the main forms of inﬂuence are authority (from the boss to the
secretary) and helping disposition (hopefully symmetric!).Finally, the effectiveness of
different modes of social inﬂuence depends on whether they are exercised within or
3The actual process by which this resolution is achieved depends on the speciﬁcs of the agent architecture
that is used.For this reason, it is beyond the scope of this paper.However, in Section 6 we will introduce some of
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outside social relationships.Whereas some modes of inﬂuence can be exploited mainly
within pre-existing social relationships, others can be exercised also when no social rela-
tionship already exists and one of the agents is unaware of the existence of the other
(see our deﬁnition of social relationship in Section 4.4). For example, benevolence and
helping disposition often reﬂects forms of social inﬂuence that occurs within existing
social relationships (e. g.friendship).Conversely, authority and persuasion can be exer-
cised even in the absence of any social relationship between agents.For example, the
Prime Minister may exercise authority over the citizens without being aware of the iden-
tity of each of them, and therefore outside of any social relationship.Or, alternatively,
let us consider a consumer who might be persuaded simply by an advertisement to adopt
the intention to buy a new product.Again, in this case persuasion is exercised outside
of any social relationship, since the producer cannot be aware of all the consumers who
are potentially interested in buying the product.
In our framework, the notion of social relationship builds on the concept of multi-
agent system role structure and the instantiation of two (or more) related roles by two
(or more) agents.Given a role structure, each role presumes the appropriate enactment
of the other roles that are interrelated with it.For example, let us consider again the pair
of related roles “boss” and “secretary” and their instantiation by two different agents.
These roles are related because each of them entails a set of expectations concerning
the mental state and behaviour of the agent who occupies the other.In fact, attached
to the secretary role are beliefs about the beliefs, goals and intentions attached to the
boss role, whereas attached to the boss role is a set of beliefs about the beliefs, goals
and intentions attached to the secretary role.A speciﬁc instantiation of the related roles
“boss” and “secretary” by two agents gives rise to a social relationship between those
agents.This social relationship can be regarded as a major causal force that shapes
the role-players’ mental states and behaviour.For instance, by taking on the role of
secretary, an agent adopts the role-based beliefs about the boss’s goals and intentions,
and his or her behaviour becomes constrained by the role-based expectations concerning
the response that he or she will have to the boss’s goals and intentions.In turn, by
interacting with the agent who is in the boss role, the agent in the secretary role may
be inﬂuenced to adopt some of the former’s (idiosyncratic) beliefs, goals or intentions.
Correspondingly, by taking on the role of boss, an agent adopts the role-based beliefs
about the secretary’s goals and intentions, and his or her behaviour will be inﬂuenced
by a set of expectations concerning the principal short-run effect that a change in his
or her own goals and intentions might have upon the secretary’s day-to-day activities.
Furthermore, by interacting with the agent in the secretary role, the agent in the boss
role may be induced to rectify its expectations, update its beliefs, and modify some of
its goals and intentions concerning the secretary’s activity.
In summary, an agent’s social nature can clearly be seen to impact upon its indi-
vidual mental state and behaviour.This impact can be explained either in terms of role
adoption and the mental attitudes that are associated with roles, or in terms of social
relationships and other agents’ mental states.Besides providing new reasons for keeping
individually motivated attitudes, roles, agents and social relationships also offer mental
attitudes that can be adopted to complement or merely to change individual mental
states. This suggests a view of mental attitudes as increasingly decentralised; i.e., spread
out in the social environment.It is then the social nature of agents that leads them to
internalise socially situated mental attitudes.From this, an agent can be regarded as a
kind of associative entity, engaged in an iterated series of social actions and interactions
aimed at completing its mental state.The complex interplay between the agent and its746 Computational Intelligence
social environment turns out to be a process in which roles, other agents and social rela-
tionships play a key function: they complement and augment the agent’s bare individual
mental attitudes.It is this completing process that we term social mental shaping.With
these intuitions in place, the next section will introduce a formal multi-modal language
through which this process will be expressed.
4. BASIC DEFINITIONS
This section introduces the formal framework within which the process of social
mental shaping can be explored in more detail (a complete formal deﬁnition is given in
the Appendix).First, we give a brief description of the model of time that underpins our
logic (Section 4.1). Second, we concentrate on the formalisation of the analytical tools
and principles for reasoning about and representing the agent’s individual decision-
making apparatus (Section 4.2). Finally, we formalise the notions of roles (Section 4.3)
and social relationships (Section 4.4). The formalism used is a many-sorted, ﬁrst-order,
multi-modal language L which both draws upon and extends the work of Bell and
Huang (1997), Cohen and Levesque (1990), Rao and Georgeff (1991), and Wooldridge
and Jennings (1999). L allows us to reason about agents and their mental attitudes,
with explicit reference to time points and intervals.
Informally, the = operator is the usual ﬁrst-order equality.The operators ¬ (not)
and ∨ (or) have classical semantics, as does the universal quantiﬁer ∀.The remaining
classical connectives and the existential quantiﬁer are assumed to be introduced as
abbreviations in the usual way.We also use the punctuation symbols “)”, “(”, “]”, “[”,
and comma “,”.
4.1. Time
In L we have terms that denote time points, and we use ti, tj     and so on as
variables ranging over time points.Every occurrence of a formula   is stamped with a
time ti, written   ti , meaning that   holds at time ti.Time is taken to be composed
of points and, for simplicity, is assumed to be discrete and linear.In addition to time
points, we have terms that denote temporal intervals, and we use ii, ij     and so on as
variables ranging over time intervals.Temporal intervals are deﬁned as pairs of points.
Intervals of the form  ti t i  can equally be written as time points.For time point ti, ti+1
is the time point that increments ti; that is, ti+1 is the time point obtained by extending
ti by a time point.Similarly, for interval ii, ii + 1 is the interval that increments ii.For
example, if ii is (3, 8) then ii + 1 is (3, 9).4
It will be convenient to adopt the following abbreviations:
• Interval terms of the form  ti t i  will usually be abbreviated simply to ti.
• Multiple occurrences of the same interval term may be eliminated when the result
is unambiguous.For example,    ∧    ii  abbreviates     ii ∧     ii .
• In complex sentences the same temporal terms are often repeated.In what follows we
will adopt the convention that a missing temporal term in a well-formed formula is the
same as the closest temporal term to its right.For example, Bel ai Goal aj     ti 
states that at time ti agent ai believes that at time ti agent aj has the goal to make
  true at time ti.
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4.2. Agents
We have terms that denote agents, and we use ai, aj     and so on as variables
ranging over individual agents.Agents are typically required to perform several tasks,
and have to make decisions about how to achieve them.There are a number of prop-
erties that characterise agents (Franklin and Graesser 1997; Jennings 2000; Wooldridge
2000; Wooldridge and Jennings 1995).First, agents are autonomous, that is, they have
control over their tasks and resources and will take part in cooperative activities only
if they choose to do so.Second, agents are reactive: they respond to any perceived
change that takes place within their environment and that affects their mental states.
Third, agents are proactive: they do not simply act in response to their environment,
but they exhibit opportunistic behaviour, take the initiative where appropriate, exploit
and create serendipity (Wooldridge 2000).Fourth, agents have social ability: they can
initiate social relationships with one another and may be mutually supportive during
the execution of their joint actions (Carley and Newell 1994).
Given this, agents are here conceptualised as cognitive agents endowed with men-
tal attitudes representing the world and motivating action (Panzarasa et al.2001a;
Wooldridge 2000).Furthermore, not only does an agent have an intentional stance
towards the world, but it also represents other agents as cognitive agents similarly
endowed with mental attitudes for representational and motivational purposes (Dennett
1987).The cognitive characterisation of the agents’ mental states and decision-making
apparatus is here formalised building on a fairly standard BDI framework (Cavedon
et al.1997; Cohen and Levesque 1990; Rao and Georgeff 1991; Singh 1995; Wooldridge
2000).More speciﬁcally, agents’ mental states are here seen as sets of interrelated
mental attitudes, among which there are doxastic attitudes (beliefs) and motivational
attitudes (desires, goals, intentions).In what follows, we will develop the technical appa-
ratus for dealing with the semantics of individual agents’ beliefs (Section 4.2.1), desires
(Section 4.2.2), goals (Section 4.2.3), and intentions (Section 4.2.4). In Section 4.2.5, we
will then introduce a joint doxastic mental attitude, namely mutual beliefs, that builds
on and transcends individual agents’ beliefs.
4.2.1. Beliefs. An agent’s belief set includes beliefs concerning the world, beliefs
concerning mental attitudes of other agents, and introspective beliefs (see discussion
below).This belief set may be incomplete.An agent may update its beliefs by observing
the world and by receiving messages from other agents.
To express an agent’s beliefs, we introduce the modal operator Bel ai    ti , which
means that at time ti agent ai has a belief that   holds.The formal semantics of this
modal operator are a natural extension of the traditional Hintikka’s possible-worlds
semantics (Hintikka 1962, 1972).In a model M, for each world w, agent ai and time
point ti, there is an associated possible-worlds frame  W Bel ai t i w , R Bel ai t i w   which
is centred at w.In other words, W Bel ai t i w  is a set of possible worlds that contains w,
and R Bel ai t i w  is a binary relation on W Bel ai t i w  such that  w  w  ∈R Bel ai t i w  for
every w   = w in W Bel ai t i w .If  w  w  ∈R Bel ai t i w , then w  is a doxastic alternative
for ai at ti in w; that is, in w at ti, ai cannot distinguish w  from the actual world w.
For model M, world w in M and variable assignment g, the semantic clause for Bel
sentences is as follows:
M  w  g |= Bel ai    ti  iff M  w  g|=   for all  w  w  ∈R Bel ai t i w 748 Computational Intelligence
For simplicity, we assume the usual Hintikka-style schemata for Bel, that is the
KD45 axioms (corresponding to a “Weak S5 modal logic”) and “necessitation” rule5
(Chellas 1980):
[KB] |= Bel ai    ti ∧Bel ai    ⊃     ti ⊃Bel ai    ti  (closure under
logical consequence)
 DB | = Bel ai    ti ⊃¬ Bel ai ¬   ti  (consistency axiom)
[4B] |= Bel ai    ti ⊃Bel ai Bel ai     ti  (introspection axiom)
[5B] |= ¬Bel ai    ti ⊃Bel ai ¬Bel ai     ti  (negative introspection axiom)
[NB] |=   ti ⊃ | =Bel ai    ti  (inference rule of necessitation)
The following conditions are imposed on the Belief-accessibility relation (Cohen
and Levesque 1990):
[B1] Each R Bel ai t i w  is serial.
[B2] Each R Bel ai t i w  is transitive.
[B3] Each R Bel ai t i w  is euclidean.
A Belief-accessibility relation that satisﬁes conditions B1 to B3 validates the DB4B5B
axioms.Furthermore, since axiom K B is valid, it will be a theorem of any complete
axiomatisation of normal modal logic.Similarly, the necessitation rule N B is a rule of
inference in any axiomatisation of normal modal logic (Chellas 1980).
4.2.2. Desires. An agent’s desires are here conceived as the set of states of the
world that the agent wishes to bring about (Bell 1995; Bell and Huang 1997; Kraus et al.
1998).Desires may not always be consistent.For example, an agent may desire to be
healthy, but also to smoke; the two desires may lead to a contradiction.Furthermore,
an agent may have unrealisable desires; that is, desires that conﬂict with what it believes
possible.
To express an agent’s desires, we introduce the modal operator Des ai    ti , which
means that at time ti agent ai has a desire towards  .We take desires to be either
present- or future-directed; that is, Des ai   tj   ti  means that agent ai has, at time
ti, the desire that   holds at tj, where ti ≤ tj.
The semantic clause for Des is analogous to that for Bel.We take KD as the basis
of our logic of desires:
[KD] |= Des ai    ti ∧Des ai    ⊃     ti ⊃Des ai    ti 
Furthermore, we have a necessitation property (Chellas 1980):
[ND] |=   ti ⊃| =Des ai    ti 
Again, axiom KD and the necessitation rule ND are, respectively, a theorem and a
rule of inference in any axiomatisation of normal modal logic (Chellas 1980).
5In all the following axiom schemas, we will assume that the unbound variables are universally quantiﬁed as
follows: ∀ai ∈ DAg ∀ti ∈ DT, ∀w ∈ W , where DAg, DT, and W are, respectively, non-empty sets of agents, time
points, and possible worlds (see Appendix).In addition, in all the axiom schemas, we assume that   and   can be
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4.2.3. Goals. Goals can be deﬁned as a set of consistent states of the world that
an agent autonomously chooses as potential candidates for motivating and governing
its current and future behaviour.Thus, goals represent an agent’s agenda comprising
the autonomously selected states that the agent might be expected to bring about (Bell
and Huang 1997).Even though an agent may well choose some of its goals among its
desires, nonetheless there may be goals that are not necessarily desires.On the one
hand, the goals that are also desires represent those states of the world that the agent
might be expected to bring about precisely because they reﬂect what the agent wishes
to achieve.In this case, the agent’s selection of goals among its desires is constrained by
two conditions.First, since goals must be consistent and desires may be inconsistent (see
Section 4.2.2), only the subsets of consistent desires can be the potential candidates for
being moved up to goal-status, and also the selected subsets of consistent desires must
be consistent with each other.Second, since desires may be unrealisable whereas goals
must be consistent with beliefs (see below), only a set of feasible (and consistent) desires
can be potentially transformed into goals.On the other hand, an agent may generate
goals that are not desires; that is, an agent might be expected to bring about states that
do not necessarily represent the states of the world that it wishes to achieve.6 Typically,
these are goals that are instrumental to the achievement of those goals that are also
desires.For example, an agent may generate the goal to work hard simply because it
believes this is an appropriate way to fulﬁl its goal/desire to become successful.In this
case, even though the agent may not desire to work hard, nonetheless adopting this
goal may be instrumental to the achievement of another goal that is also a desire.
To express an agent’s goals, we introduce the modal operator Goal ai    ti , which
means that at time ti agent ai has a goal towards  .Like desires, goals can only be
present-directed or future-directed, that is, Goal ai   tj   ti  means that agent ai has,
at time ti, the goal that   holds at tj, where ti ≤ tj.
The following axioms KG and DG state that goals are assumed to be, respectively,
closed under implication and consistent:
[KG] |= Goal ai    ti ∧Goal ai    ⊃     ti ⊃Goal ai    ti 
[DG] |= Goal ai    ti ⊃¬ Goal ai ¬   ti 
We also introduce a weak realism constraint for goals (Wooldridge 2000).Agents
do not have goals towards propositions the negations of which are believed.That is,
agents’ goals do not contradict their beliefs.Formally, we have the following axiom:
[G1] |= Goal ai    ti ⊃¬ Bel ai ¬   ti 
The logic of Goal is therefore KGDGG1.The following conditions are imposed on
the Goal-accessibility relation:
[G1] Each R Goal ai t i w  is serial.
[G2] ∀w∃w  s t  w  w  ∈R Goal ai t i w  iff  w  w  ∈R Bel ai t i w  (or R Bel ai t i w ∩
R Goal ai t i w   = ∅ .
A Goal-accessibility relation that satisﬁes conditions G1 and G2 validates axioms
DG, and G1.Again, axiom K G is valid, and we have a necessitation property
6This property contrasts with the framework of Kraus et al.(1998), in which every goal is also a desire.In
contrast to them, in our framework an agent may have a goal towards  , but may not desire  .Furthermore,
Cohen and Levesque (1990) assume that all the agent’s beliefs are also its goals.We do not have such a property.
Indeed, our framework is more ﬂexible, because it allows an agent to believe  , but not to adopt it as one of its
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(Chellas 1980):
[NG] |=   ti ⊃ | =Goal ai    ti 
Finally, the semantic clause for Goal is analogous to that for Bel and Des.
4.2.4. Intentions. A fundamental characteristic of individual intentions is that they
involve a special kind of “self-commitment” to acting (von Wright 1980).As long as an
agent intends to achieve a state, it has committed itself to act accordingly, that is, to per-
form all those actions that it deems appropriate for achieving that state (Norman and
Reed 2001).Fundamentally, we can distinguish between two different forms of inten-
tions, Intentions-to and Intentions-that, depending on whether the argument is respec-
tively an action or a proposition (Bell 1995; Grosz and Kraus 1996).7 That is, intentions
can be subdivided into: (a) action-directed intentions (Intentions-to), involving the per-
formance of some action; and (b) state-directed intentions (Intentions-that), involving
the achievement of some state of affairs by performing some action.As indicated by
Grosz and Kraus (1996), both types of intention commit an agent not to adopt con-
ﬂicting intentions (Werner 1989), and constrain replanning in case of failure (Bratman
1987).However, since our main concern in this paper is with the agent’s decision-making
apparatus, in what follows we will restrict our attention to Intentions-that because they
represent the basic attitudes that commit the agent to practical reasoning and, therefore,
are inherently intertwined with its decision-making.
An agent will not adopt all its goals as intentions.The intuition is that an agent
will not, in general, be able to achieve all its goals simultaneously.It must therefore
choose a subset of its goals and commit itself to act in such a way to fulﬁl this subset.
In this case, the agent is committed to fulﬁlling intentions that are also goals.However,
not every intention is also a goal.In fact, there are intentions that the agent ought to
adopt and does not autonomously choose as potential motivators of its own behaviour.
In this case, to the extent that they do not result from the agent’s autonomous selection
and adoption, these intentions cannot be regarded as goals that the agent is committed
to achieving (see our deﬁnition of goals in Section 4.2.3). In our view, intentions that
are not goals are typically adopted by the agent for two related reasons: (a) they are
instrumental to the achievement of some of the agent’s goals; and (b) the agent is
obliged to adopt them as a result of its being subjected to others’ authority and/or to
the inﬂuence of norms, rules, and regulations.The intuition is that, once the agent has
autonomously selected its goals and, among them, its intentions, it may be automatically
compelled to adopt other intentions that are imposed from the social environment and
that are instrumental to the achievement of (some of) the goals/intentions autonomously
chosen.For example, an agent may be forced to adopt an intention by another agent
who has the authority to control the former’s behaviour (see Section 7.3). In this case,
the agent, based on its own goals and intentions, autonomously decides whether or not
to be subjected to another’s authority; however, once the authority relation has been
established, the agent may be obliged by the other to change its mental state, adopt new
intentions and modify its behaviour correspondingly.Or, alternatively, an agent may be
obliged to adopt an intention by the set of the rules, norms and regulations reﬂected
by the role(s) it has taken on in a multi-agent system (see Section 4.3.1.3). In these
circumstances, the agent autonomously decides whether or not to become a member of
the multi-agent system.However, once the decision to enter the system has been made,
7Grosz and Kraus (1996) also identify potential intentions, that is “intentions that an agent would like to adopt,
but to which it is not yet committed” (p.281).Indeed, potential intentions, so conceived of, are quite similar to
what we call goals, that is, action-drivers that are candidates for being moved up to intention-status (Section 4.2.3).Social Mental Shaping 751
the agent ought to change its mental state by adopting the intentions imposed by the
rules and norms governing that system.In both the examples above, the adoption of
new intentions is imposed by external forces (e.g. others’ authority, norms, rules) and,
as such, reﬂects the deontic aspects of the agent’s practical reasoning.
The modal operator Int ai    ti  is used to represent agent ai’s intention that
proposition   holds at time ti.In other words, Int ai    ti  means that at time ti agent
ai is committed to doing some action after which   holds.Like desires and goals,
intentions can only be present-directed or future-directed, i.e., Int ai   tj   ti  means
that agent ai has, at time ti, the intention that   holds at tj, where ti ≤ tj.
An axiomatisation for intentions can now be presented.Intentions are here taken
to be closed under implication  KI  and consistent  DI :
[KI] |= Int ai    ti ∧Int ai    ⊃     ti ⊃Int ai    ti 
[DI] |= Int ai    ti ⊃¬ Int ai ¬   ti 
As with goals, we introduce a weak realism constraint.Agents do not intend propo-
sitions the negations of which are believed.This ensures that agents’ intentions do not
contradict their beliefs (Kraus et al.1998; Wooldridge 2000).Formally, we have the
following axiom:
[II] |= Int ai    ti ⊃¬Bel ai ¬   ti 
Again, we have a necessitation property (Chellas 1980):
[NI] |=   ti ⊃| =Int ai    ti 
The logic of Int is therefore KIDII1.The following conditions are imposed on the
Intention-accessibility relation:
[[I1]] Each R Int ai t i w  is serial.
[I2] ∀w∃w  s t w  w  ∈R Int ai t i w  iff  w  w  ∈R Bel ai t i w  (or R Bel ai t i w ∩
R Int ai t i w   = ∅).
An Intention-accessibility relation that satisﬁes conditions I1 and I2 validates axioms
KI DI and I1.Finally, the semantic clause for intentions is analogous to that of beliefs,
desires, and goals.
4.2.5. Mutual Beliefs. In this section, we will develop the formalisation of mutual
beliefs, namely a form of joint doxastic higher-order mental attitude that is jointly main-
tained by a group of two or more individual agents.Crudely, a mutual belief can be
deﬁned as an inﬁnite conjunction of an agent’s belief about an agent’s belief about an
agent’s belief and so forth, that a proposition holds (Cohen and Levesque 1991).In
what follows, the focus will be only on mutual beliefs attributable to a pair of agents.
The same considerations can be extended to groups of n agents.
For agents ai and aj and formula  , our language L includes the modal operator
M-BEL  ai a j     ti , which means that, at time ti, agents ai and aj have a mutual
belief that proposition   holds.More formally, the semantics for this modal operator
can be deﬁned as follows.Firstly, we examine the semantics of each of two members
of a group having a mental attitude towards a formula.Following Rao et al.(1992), we
introduce the operator E-BEL  ai a j     ti , which means that, at time ti, both agents
ai and aj believe that   holds.We have the following deﬁnition:
∀ai a j ∀ti E-BEL  ai a j     ti ≡Bel ai    ti ∧Bel aj    ti  
Now we say that, at time ti, agents ai and aj mutually believe that  , M-BEL  ai a j ,
   ti , iff at time ti both ai and aj believe that   and each of them believes that752 Computational Intelligence
each of them believes that   and each of them believes that each of them believes
that each them believes that   and so on ad inﬁnitum (Wooldridge and Jennings
1999; Wooldridge 2000).If k ∈ N such that k>0, we deﬁne E-BELk  ai a j     ti 
inductively in the following way.Let E-BELk  ai a j     ti  be an abbreviation for
E-BEL  ai a j     ti  if k = 1, and for E-BEL  ai a j , E-BELk−1  ai a j      ti 
otherwise.The mutual belief of   in group  ai a j  at time ti is then deﬁned as follows:
M-BEL  ai a j     ti ≡

k>0 E-BELk  ai a j     ti  (see Wooldridge (2000) and
Fagin et al.(1995) for details).
Unlike some of the previous work in this area (Cavedon et al.1997), in our frame-
work mutual beliefs are not required to be ﬁrst-class entities.In fact, the formalisation
has been expressed in terms of the beliefs of the individual agents that jointly main-
tain the mutual belief.As a result, in common with other work in this ﬁeld (Kinny
et al.1994), our deﬁnition has the advantage of capturing the interplay between the
agents’ individual beliefs that are propagated upwards to a higher-order level at which
the mutual belief can be regarded as transcending the individual agents’ mental states.
4.3. Roles
Our logic L is enriched by terms that denote roles, and we use ri r j     and so on as
variables ranging over roles.Drawing on the cognitive perspective we advocated earlier
(Section 3), a role can be viewed as a set of mental attitudes governing the behaviour of
an agent occupying a particular position within the structure of a multi-agent system.The
mental attitudes that typically deﬁne roles are beliefs, goals and intentions.An agent,
by occupying a role, can adopt these role-based attitudes, and such adoption will in
turn impact upon the agent’s mental state.Some of the agent’s mental attitudes will be
modiﬁed; some simply complemented with other attitudes.So conceived of, a role turns
out to be a sub-cognitive entity (Cavedon and Sonenberg 1998; Werner 1989).That is,
a role is an entity that is endowed with mental attitudes concerning the physical and
social environment.In this view, connections among roles rest on role-based cognitive
representations of other roles in terms of their attached mental attitudes.
Our conception of roles as sub-cognitive entities needs to be further clariﬁed in
two respects.First, being sub-cognitive means that, although endowed with mental atti-
tudes, roles do not have the capacity to perform cognitive processes (e.g. reasoning,
decision-making) through the transformation of their mental attitudes.For example, a
role cannot transform a goal that is attached to it into an intention.Such a transfor-
mation can only be done by a (cognitive) agent who takes on the role, then adopts the
attached goal, and ﬁnally commits itself to fulﬁl it (Rao and Georgeff 1991).Second,
although endowed with mental attitudes, roles are just organisational constructs.As
such, they cannot be regarded as (sub-cognitive) agents, because they do not have the
capacity to perform actions and, therefore, they are unable to affect the external world
in order to reduce the discrepancy between the world and their regulatory internal rep-
resentations (Bratman 1987).For example, roles may be endowed with goals, but do
not have the capacity to pursue them.Only an agent, by adopting a role-based goal,
can bring about a state of the world in which the goal is attained.
Our attempt to develop a cognitive model of roles is not entirely new in the litera-
ture.Werner (1989) characterises a social role as a description of an abstract agent, Rr,
that deﬁnes the state information, permissions, responsibilities, and values of that agent
role.According to Werner, when an agent a takes on a role r, it changes its mental state
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also characterise roles in terms of mental attitudes.They associate goals with roles,
using the modality RoleGoal.In their framework, RoleGoal r     asserts that adopting
role r involves adopting goal  .This provides them with a useful level of abstraction
to express generic social commitment (see Section 2).Thus, according to Cavedon and
Sonenberg’s model, whenever an agent a adopts role r, a commitment to taking on goal
  arises.This social commitment is taken to be between a and the other agents that
are involved in the corresponding relationships.Furthermore, Cavedon and Sonenberg
extend their framework to capture the different inﬂuences and responsibilities that dif-
ferent roles may have on the same agent.To model this, they introduce the predicate
Inﬂuence a  r  rn   r  rn     to assert that role r in relationship rn is more inﬂuential to
agent a than role r  in rn .
The cognitive model of roles presented in this paper will extend the above-mentioned
frameworks along the following lines.Roles are associated not only with goals and infor-
mation, but more generally with the standard set of mental attitudes that are usually
introduced to describe and reason about rational agency (however, here roles are not
taken to be associated with desires; see Section 4.3.1 for details). This is important in
order to investigate the full impact that a role in a multi-agent system can have on an
agent’s mental state.To this end, the logic proposed here is enriched by a predicate,
In, and three primary modal operators—RoleBel, RoleGoal, and RoleInt.
First, the 2-place predicate In ai r i  ti  expresses the fact that some agent is in a
role.Speciﬁcally, In ai r i  ti  asserts that agent ai is in role ri at time ti.For example,
if ai is Linda and ri is “secretary of the department,” In ai r i  ti  means that at time ti
Linda acts as the secretary of the department.
Second, three modal operators are introduced that allow the development of a cog-
nitive characterisation of roles in terms of their attached mental attitudes (see Section
4.3.1 for details). Together these three operators express the mental attitudes that an
agent can internalise by adopting the role to which they are attached.In Section 5 it
is shown that this characterisation of roles in terms of their attached mental attitudes
underpins our formalisation of the impact that the role structure of a multi-agent system
has on the mental states of the system’s members.Like agents’ mental attitudes (see
Sections 4.2.1–4.2.4), the semantics of role-based mental attitudes will be expressed via
accessibility relations between possible worlds.
The cognitive characterisation of roles advocated here must be further speciﬁed.
Attached to roles there are two main types of mental attitudes: mandatory attitudes
and optional attitudes.On the one hand, role-based mandatory attitudes are constitu-
tive and relevant to the role to which they are attached.These are the attitudes that the
agent must adopt whenever it takes on the role.On the other hand, role-based optional
attitudes are not intimately constitutive of the role to which they are attached.These
are the attitudes that the role-player may decide whether or not to adopt.For example,
attached to the role of secretary there might be the goal of supervising the boss’s cor-
respondence.This refers to a job speciﬁcation and the role-player may be obliged to
adopt such a goal.However, there might well be the attached goal of being friendly with
the other people in the department, and the secretary is just expected but not obliged
to behave this way with his or her colleagues.In Section 5, this distinction between
mandatory and optional role-based mental attitudes is shown to be fundamental to the
problem of preventing automatic attitude-adoption whenever an agent occupies a role in
a multi-agent system.Indeed, it is both unnecessary and dangerously strong to always
force an agent to adopt the mental attitudes associated with its role through the use of
axiom schemas.Although there is no doubt that an agent is committed to adopting a
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which an autonomous agent can decide whether or not to adopt a role-based mental
attitude.In particular, there might be attitudes attached to roles that an agent decides
not to adopt, for its own reasons.
Note that the model described here is more ﬂexible than Cavedon and Sonenberg’s
(1998) framework, according to which the role-player is expected/requested to adopt
all the mental attitudes (goals) attached to the role.In the approach advocated in this
paper, an agent is expected/required to adopt only a subset of the mental attitudes that
are attached to the role it has taken on, namely the subset of mandatory attitudes.Also,
this notion of mandatory role-based mental attitudes is consistent with the concept
of organisational commitment (Handy 1993).When a member, ai, is organisationally
committed to its group, it is committed to adopting (some of) the mental attitudes that
are attached to the role it has taken on within the group.Then, ai’s organisational
commitment to the group implies that ai is committed to acting in accordance with
the responsibilities, expectations, requests, obligations relative to (some of) the mental
attitudes attached to its role.Therefore, our characterisation of roles as sets of mental
attitudes that include mandatory ones is consistent with the prescriptive account of
roles as sets of behavioural obligations, rights and privileges based on the role-player’s
organisational commitment to the group.8
4.3.1. Role-based Mental Attitudes. The set of role-based mental attitudes includes
beliefs, goals and intentions.Each of these attitudes, once adopted by the role-player,
will impact upon its behaviour by modifying its mental state.First, an agent, by taking
on a role, may complement and/or change the information it already maintains about
the world with the information attached to the role.In this respect, adopting a role
affects the role-player’s decision-making behaviour, the way alternatives are searched
for and evaluated, and ultimately how actions are selected and performed (Simon 1957).
Second, attached to a role are goals that represent the set of states of the world that the
role-player might be expected to bring about.Examples of role-based goals include gen-
eral indications of conduct that might be expected to guide the role-player’s behaviour,
such as recommendations concerning support to co-members, attitudes towards supe-
riors, and means of communication.By taking on a role and adopting the role-based
goals, an agent therefore complements and/or modiﬁes its own agenda that might moti-
vate its current and future behaviour (Bell and Huang 1997).In our view, role-based
goals are optional mental attitudes that the role-player may decide whether or not to
adopt.Conversely, the third category of mental attitudes provided by roles, namely role-
based intentions, are mandatory attitudes typically reﬂecting the role-player’s duties and
obligations.9 Examples of role-based intentions are role prescriptions such as rules and
regulations, standards, policy decisions, job descriptions, or directives from superiors.
Thus, role-based intentions are mandatory mental attitudes that the role-player is com-
pelled to adopt.By taking on a role and internalising its attached intentions, an agent
will modify its self-commitments to acting and its behaviour will be affected accordingly
(von Wright 1980).Finally, unlike individual agents’ mental states, roles do not include
8Note that although our notion of roles is consistent with the account of roles as sets of behavioural obliga-
tions, rights and privileges, this distinction between mandatory and optional attitudes is not as rich as the variety
of individual and collective normative positions proposed by authors such as Lindahl (1977) and Sergot (1998).
9Note that, even though role-based intentions reﬂect the rules, norms and regulations that govern a multi-
agent system, nonetheless the role-player may still have the freedom to decide how to comply with (some of) these
role-based intentions.That is, there may be different degrees of cogency in role-based intentions.For example,
the role-player may have the opportunity to determine its own role expectations where role-based intentions are
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desires.In fact, in our framework, desires are taken to typically reﬂect the cognitive
freedom of those agents who are endowed with a fully explicated model of cognition
and a decision-making apparatus.Therefore, desires cannot be regarded as attached to
sub-cognitive entities such as roles.
In what follows, we will now give a brief description of the technical details for
dealing with the semantics of role-based beliefs, goals and intentions.To this end, we
will introduce three new modal operators, RoleBel ri    ti , RoleGoal ri    ti , and
RoleInt ri    ti , which mean that at time ti, respectively, the belief that   holds, the
goal towards  , and the intention towards   are attached to role ri.
4.3.1.1. Role-based Beliefs
The belief set attached to a role includes beliefs concerning the world and beliefs
concerning the mental attitudes attached to other roles.This belief set may be incom-
plete.As with agents’ beliefs, we use Hintikka’s possible-worlds semantics to develop a
formalisation for role-based beliefs (Hintikka 1962, 1972).In a model M, for each world
w, role ri and time point ti, there is an associated possible-worlds frame  W RoleBel ri t i w ,
R RoleBel ri t i w   which is centred at w.If  w  w  ∈R RoleBel ri t i w , then w  is a doxastic
alternative for ri at ti in w; that is, in w at ti, and for ri, w  cannot be distinguished from
the actual world w.
Given this, the semantic clause for RoleBel sentences is similar to the semantic
clause for Bel sentences.Finally, the axiomatisation of RoleBel simply reﬂects the fact
that role-based beliefs are here assumed to be closed under consequence (Chellas 1980).
Furthermore, we have the usual inference rule of necessitation.Unlike individual agents’
beliefs, role-based beliefs are not taken to be consistent.In fact, attached to roles may
be different pieces of information that might contradict each other.This situation is
typically referred to as role ambiguity, and may result from a lack of clarity of the infor-
mation available for the adequate performance of the role (Handy 1993).Role ambigu-
ity often relates to such matters as the methods of performing tasks, standards of work,
and the evaluation and appraisal of performance.Finally, unlike agents’ beliefs, role-
based beliefs are not axiomatised by the introspection and the negative introspection
axioms.In fact, these axioms reﬂect a degree of cognitive awareness that goes beyond
the restricted sub-cognitive capabilities of roles.Given this, the Role-Belief accessibility
relation is not taken to be further constrained, as closure under logical consequence
and the necessitation rule are, respectively, a theorem and a rule of inference in any
axiomatisation of normal modal logic (Chellas 1980).
4.3.1.2. Role-based Goals
Role-based goals reﬂect the set of behaviours that might be expected of a role-player
by the occupants of other related roles.They provide guidelines for certain patterns of
behaviour that, although not speciﬁed in detail, might nonetheless, once adopted, impact
upon the role-player’s mental state.Role-based goals can only be present-directed or
future-directed, that is, RoleGoal ri   tj   ti  means that attached to role ri, at time ti,
there is a goal that   holds at tj, where ti ≤ tj.
Like beliefs, the semantics of role-based goals draw on Hintikka’s possible worlds
semantics, and therefore the semantic clause for RoleGoal is analogous to that for
RoleBel (Hintikka 1962, 1972).Furthermore, the axiomatisation of role-based goals sim-
ply reﬂects closure under consequence and the necessitation property (Chellas 1980).
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fact, attached to roles, there might be goals reﬂecting contradictory expectations of
behaviour.Inconsistency between role-based goals is typically referred to as role incom-
patibility, and arises when the role-player faces a situation in which simultaneous differ-
ent or contradictory expectations create conﬂict (Handy 1993).In these circumstances,
compliance with one set of role-based goals makes it difﬁcult or impossible to comply
with other goals.An example concerns an agent’s acting as the managing director of a
business unit, who might face opposing expectations from the ﬁnance director (who is
mainly concerned with balancing outgoing and incoming cash-ﬂows) and the marketing
director (who is mainly concerned with the capability of the products and/or services
sold of meeting the customers’ needs and maximising the revenues raised).Another
typical example of inconsistency between role-based goals is role overload.This occurs
when the role-player is faced with too many expectations and is therefore unable to
meet all of them satisfactorily (Handy 1993).In these circumstances, some role expec-
tations must be neglected in order to satisfy others, and this leads to a conﬂict of priority
(see Section 6).
Finally, unlike agents’ goals, role-based goals are not taken to be constrained by
a weak realism condition (Wooldridge 2000).This means that attached to roles there
might be pieces of information that contradict the pattern of behaviours that might be
expected of the role-player.This represents another case of role ambiguity that reﬂects
uncertainty and a lack of clarity as to the precise requirements of the role (Handy
1993).In these situations, the role-player might be unable to adequately perform what
is expected, and its own perceptions of the role-based goals might differ from the expec-
tations of other agents.
4.3.1.3. Role-based Intentions
Role-based intentions provide the role-player with a self-commitment to acting (von
Wright 1980).That is, by adopting a role-based intention, an agent commits itself to
act accordingly.Since a role is not a cognitive agent with capabilities of performing
behaviour, role-based intentions cannot be action-directed intentions (Intentions-to).
In fact, these intentions involve the performance of some action by the same entity that
holds them (Bell 1995; Grosz and Kraus 1996).Therefore, all role-based intentions are
here taken to be state-directed intentions (Intentions-that), thus reﬂecting some state
of affairs that a potential role-player will commit itself to bring about.
Like role-based goals, role-based intentions can only be present-directed or future-
directed, that is, RoleInt ri   tj   ti  means that attached to role ri, at time ti, there
is an intention that   holds at tj, where ti ≤ tj.Furthermore, in accordance with our
formalisation of the individual agent’s cognitive make-up, we do not take role-based
intentions to be a subset of role-based goals. In fact, as mentioned in Section 4.3.1, role-
based intentions are mandatory attitudes that the role-player ought to adopt whenever
it takes on the role, whereas role-based goals are optional attitudes that the role-player
may autonomously decide whether or not to adopt.
Finally, like beliefs and goals, the semantics of role-based goals draw on Hintikka’s
possible worlds semantics, and the semantic clause for RoleGoal is therefore analo-
gous to that for RoleBel and RoleGoal (Hintikka 1962, 1972).Given this, in common
with role-based goals, the axiomatisation of role-based intentions simply reﬂects closure
under logical consequence and the necessitation rule (Chellas 1980).Like role-based
goals, role-based intentions are not constrained by a consistency axiom and a weak
realism property.Therefore, attached to a role there might be intentions that contradict
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to the same role.The implications of this in terms of role incompatibility, overload, and
ambiguity are similar to what has been said above about role-based goals that might be
inconsistent with one another and with role-based beliefs.
4.4. Social Relationships
Attitude adoption via role-adoption is not the only way in which sociality can have
an impact upon an agent’s mental state.Indeed, an agent can also be socially inﬂuenced
to adopt or to keep a mental attitude by its being in a social relationship with an
acquaintance (as discussed in Section 3).Therefore, in order to analyse this form of
social inﬂuence we need to introduce and formalise the notion of social relationships
between agents.
In addition to roles, we have terms that denote relationship types, and we use  ri r j ,
 rj r k      and so on as variables ranging over relationship types.A relationship type,
 ri r j , represents a relationship abstraction between a pair of roles.For example, the
roles “boss” and “secretary” can be linked by a particular type of social relationship that
empowers one to dictate certain aspects of the work agenda of the other.An instan-
tiation of a relationship type gives rise to a social relationship between agents.10 For
example, the boss-secretary relationship type can give rise to a number of relationship
instances—one involving agent ai as the boss and agent aj as secretary, another one
involving the same agent ai as the boss and agent ak as secretary.
We introduce the operator rel ai a j  ri r j   ti  to indicate that agents ai and aj
are in a social relationship of type  ri r j  at time ti.Formally, we have the following
deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 4.1.At time ti, agents ai and aj are in a social relationship of type  ri r j 
iff, at ti: (a) ai occupies role ri and aj occupies role rj, or vice versa; and (b) ai and aj
mutually believe that (a).Formally, we have:
∀ai a j ∀ ri r j  ∀ti rel ai a j  ri r j   ti 
≡  In ai r i ∧In aj r j ∧M-BEL  ai a j   In ai r i ∧In aj r j     ti 
∨ In aj r i ∧In ai r j ∧M-BEL  ai a j   In aj r i ∧In ai r j     ti 
5. FORMS OF SOCIAL MENTAL SHAPING
Social mental shaping is a social process affecting an agent’s mental state.More
precisely, it refers to the phenomenon that the mere social nature of agents impacts
upon their mental attitudes, and thereby motivates their behaviour.The process of
social mental shaping may involve social roles, social relationships or simply other agents
outside of any relationship (see discussion below).Its typical outcome is a modiﬁcation
of an agent’s mental state.This may happen either when the agent is socially motivated
to adopt a new mental attitude, or when the agent is socially motivated to have new
reasons for keeping a mental attitude adopted at an earlier stage.
10The fact that in our framework social relationships are deﬁned in terms of types of relationships between
roles implies that a relationship between two agents exists as long as the agents occupy two related roles.For
example, should two individuals, who are husband and wife, play, respectively, the role of boss in the marketing
department and secretary in the human relations department in a business ﬁrm, and should these two roles not be
connected with each other, then the two individuals are not in a social relationship with respect to that particular
pair of roles.Conversely, they will be in a social relationship with respect to the related roles “husband” and “wife. ”758 Computational Intelligence
In what follows we will give the technical apparatus for dealing with the process of
social mental shaping in all of its three basic forms: (a) social mental shaping based on
social roles (Section 5.1); (b) social mental shaping occurring between agents outside
of any social relationship (5.2.1); and (c) social mental shaping occurring within social
relationships (5.2.2). To this end, we will introduce the modal operator Inﬂ that will be
used to formalise all the above forms of social mental shaping.For simplicity, we write
Att ai    ti  to indicate that agent ai, at time ti, has a mental attitude towards  .
5.1. Roles and Social Mental Shaping
We formalise the inﬂuence of a role on an agent’s mental state by expressing the
modal operator Inﬂ in terms of Att ai    and ri, where Att ai    represents either a
belief, a goal or an intention that agent ai holds towards  , whereas ri is a role.We
have:
∀ai ∀ri ∀tiInfl Att ai    r i  ti ≡RoleAtt ri    ti ∧Bel ai RoleAtt ri     ti 
∧In ai r i  ti ∧  In ai r i ⊃Att ai     ti 
Informally, the meaning of Infl Att ai    r i  ti  is that at time ti agent ai is socially
inﬂuenced by role ri to have the attitude Att towards a state of the world   iff at time
ti: (a) Att towards   is an attitude attached to role ri; (b) agent ai believes that Att
towards   is attached to ri; (c) ai occupies ri; and (d) ai’s taking on role ri implies ai’s
adopting or keeping the attitude Att towards  .11
Given the above deﬁnition, it is trivial to note that if at time ti agent ai is socially
inﬂuenced by role ri with respect to a mental attitude Att towards  , then at time ti
agent ai will hold that attitude.In such situations, Att is a socially motivated attitude.
Formally, we have the following social mental shaping rule (schema):
[S1] |= ∀ ai ∀ri ∀ti In fl Att ai    r i  ti ⊃Att ai    ti .
Note that the following schema is not valid:
  ∀ai ∀ri ∀ti In ai r i  ti ∧Att ai    ti   ⊃ Infl Att ai    r i  ti  
Thus, a role-player might occupy a role and hold a mental attitude without nec-
essarily being inﬂuenced by that role to adopt or keep that attitude.For example, the
attitude might not be attached to the role, and the agent might simply be internally
motivated to adopt it.
Further, note that the following schema holds only for role-based mandatory atti-
tudes, namely role-based intentions (Section 4.3.1.3):
[S2] |= ∀ ai ∀ri ∀ti RoleInt ri    ti ∧Bel ai RoleInt ri     ti 
∧In ai r i  ti   ⊃ Infl Int ai    r i  ti .
That is, if there is a mandatory intention attached to a role, and the agent is aware
of this, then the agent will automatically adopt such an intention by occupying the role.12
11Note that this deﬁnition does not imply that the agent is socially inﬂuenced by a role only when the role
strictly motivates the agent to adopt a new attitude.In fact, the agent might already have an individually motivated
attitude that is the same as the one attached to the role.In this case, however, occupying the role and believing
that the attitude is attached to the role provide the agent with another reason to keep its attitude.An attitude
that was only individually motivated when adopted originally by the agent, now becomes supported and socially
motivated by the role that the agent occupies.The same considerations also apply to the other two forms of social
mental shaping occurring between agents (Section 5.2).
12In this case, if the agent already has the role-based mandatory intention before occupying the role, then the
role will simply provide the agent with new reasons for keeping the intention.Speciﬁcally, an intention that the
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In such a situation, the role-player is subjected to social mental shaping.Note that S2
does not hold with optional role-based attitudes: in fact, in these circumstances, the
role-player may decide not to adopt the attitudes attached to the role, for whatever
reason.
5.2. Social Mental Shaping Between Agents
Social mental shaping between agents may take place either within or outside social
relationships.In either case, one agent is inﬂuenced by another to adopt or to keep a
mental attitude.Furthermore, a social relationship may represent not only the input but
also the output of a social mental shaping process.For example, when an agent wishes
to get involved in a new relationship with another agent, it may well decide to persuade
the latter via a process of argumentation aimed at having that new type of relationship
established.Here, the new social relationship represents the outcome of the exercise
of social inﬂuence.In what follows, we will formalise the basic form of social mental
shaping between agents, namely that one occurring outside of any social relationship.
In Section 5.2.2, social mental shaping within social relationships will be dealt with in
more detail.
5.2.1. Social Mental Shaping Outside Social Relationships. To formalise social
mental shaping occurring between a pair of agents and outside of any social relationship,
we express the modal operator Inﬂ in terms of Att ai   , where Att ai    represents
either a belief, a desire, a goal or an intention that agent ai holds towards  .We have:
∀ai ∀ti Infl Att ai     ti ≡∃aj s.t. Att aj    ti ∧Bel ai Att aj     ti 
∧ Bel ai Att aj     ⊃ Att ai     ti 
Informally, Infl Att ai     ti  means that, at time ti, agent ai is socially inﬂuenced
to adopt or to keep the mental attitude Att towards   iff at time ti: (a) there is another
agent aj who holds Att towards  ; (b) ai believes that aj holds Att; and (c) ai’s believing
that aj holds Att implies ai’s adopting or keeping attitude Att.This form of social mental
shaping covers several inﬂuence patterns among agents, from imitation of others’ desires
to spontaneous goal-adoption, from benevolent (not due) adhesion to others’ intentions,
to exploitation and adoption of others’ beliefs (see Section 7).Note that in all these
cases of social mental shaping the two agents need not be in a social relationship (e.g.
one of them might not be aware of the other), as opposed to the form of social mental
shaping detailed below.
5.2.2. Social Relationships and Social Mental Shaping. We now want to formalise
how an agent’s mental state can be inﬂuenced by its being within a social relationship
with another agent.To this end, we now express our modality Inﬂ in terms of Att ai   
and rel ai a j  ri r j  , where Att ai    represents either a belief, a desire, a goal or an
intention that agent ai holds towards  , whereas rel ai a j  ri r j   represents a social
relationship of type  ri r j  between agents ai and aj.We have:
∀ai a j ∀ ri r j  ∀ti Infl Att ai    rel ai a j  ri r j    ti 
≡ rel ai a j  ri r j   ti ∧Att aj    ti ∧Bel ai Att aj     ti 
∧ Bel ai Att aj     ⊃ Att ai     ti 
Informally, we say that, at time ti, agent ai is inﬂuenced to adopt or to keep attitude
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another agent aj iff at time ti: (a) agents ai and aj are in social relationship of type
 ri r j ; (b) aj holds the mental attitude Att towards  , (c) ai believes that aj holds Att;
and (d) ai’s believing that aj holds Att implies ai’s adopting or keeping the attitude Att
towards  .With the following schema S3, it is trivial to note that if at time ti agent
ai’s mental state is socially inﬂuenced by the social relationship that ai has with aj
with respect to a mental attitude Att towards  , then at time ti agent ai will hold that
attitude.In such a situation, Att is a socially motivated attitude.Formally, we have:
[S3] |= ∀ ai a j ∀ ri r j  ∀ti Infl Att ai    rel ai a j  ri r j    ti ⊃Att ai    ti  
In general, this form of social mental shaping is based, and depends, on the agent’s
decision whether or not to adopt one of its acquaintance’s mental attitudes.However,
as with role-based social mental shaping, there are circumstances in which an agent
involved in a social relationship with another is required to adopt or to keep one or more
of its acquaintance’s mental attitudes.In such cases, the agent might well autonomously
decide whether or not to establish a relationship with another agent but, once estab-
lished, the relationship may automatically impose a number of mental attitudes on the
former’s mental state.These are relationship-based mandatory intentions (see Section
7.3). For example, the boss is by right allowed to order other employees to perform
particular activities. In this case, if a secretary decides to interact (i.e., establish a social
relationship) with a boss, then he or she ought to change his or her mental state so as
to adopt some of the intentions imposed by the boss.For such attitudes, we have the
following schema:
[S4] |= ∀ ai a j ∀ ri r j  ∀ti  rel ai a j  ri r j   ti ∧IntM ai t i  ri r j   aj    ti 
∧Bel ai IntM ai t i  ri r j   aj     ti   ⊃ Infl Int ai    rel ai a j  ri r j    ti 
where IntM ai t i  ri r j   aj    ti  represents an intention held by agent aj that aj has the
authority to impose upon agent ai if, at time ti, ai relates to aj within a relationship
of type  ri r j .Informally, if an agent establishes a social relationship with another
agent who holds a mental attitude that is mandatory for the former with respect to that
relationship, then the former will automatically adopt this attitude.13 Note that S4 does
not hold with non-mandatory relationship-based attitudes: in this case, the agent may
decide whether or not to adopt its acquaintance’s mental attitudes.
This form of social mental shaping, based on instantiations of role relationships,
enables us to identify and formalise a particular type of relationship between agents that
reﬂects the mental link that binds them together.We introduce the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 5.1.At time ti, agents ai and aj are in a social cognitive relationship of type
 ri r j  iff, at ti: (a) they are in a social relationship of type  ri r j ; and (b) at least one
of the two agents adopts or keeps a mental attitude simply because it believes that the
other holds that attitude.Formally, we have:
∀ai a j ∀ ri r j  ∀ti cogn ai a j  ri r j   ti 
≡ Infl Att ai    rel ai a j  ri r j    ti ∨Infl Att aj    rel ai a j  ri r j    ti  
13As noted with roles, the agent may already hold a relationship-based mandatory attitude before it enters
the relationship.In this case, establishing the relationship gives the agent new reasons for keeping that attitude.
Furthermore, note that an agent may also have the authority to impose upon another agent intentions that it does
not hold.This case is not captured by our model since we deﬁne social mental shaping in terms of an agent’s being
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Informally, the operator cogn ai a j  ri r j   ti  means that, at time ti, agents ai and
aj, are in a social cognitive relationship of type  ri r j .This takes place iff at ti at least
one of the agents is subjected to the social mental shaping exercised by the other.
Not only can social mental shaping occur within a relationship between two agents;
more generally, it can also arise within a group of two or more agents linked together
by a set of social relationships.An obvious example is a project team where a number
of agents work together and may inﬂuence one another to adopt such mental attitudes
as beliefs, goals or intentions.In such situations, two or more agents are connected to
each other via a web of social cognitive relationships that give rise to a social cognitive
structure (Krackhardt 1987).The next step is, therefore, to formalise such structures in
which an agent can be involved in multiple social cognitive relationships.To this end,
we ﬁrst need to introduce the notion of role structure; drawing on this, we will then
deﬁne the concepts of social structure and social relationship structure.
As mentioned in Section 3, a role structure is a set of interrelated roles.Formally,
we have:
Deﬁnition 5.2.A role structure RS is a tuple  R T , where:
• R =  ri r j        = ∅ is a non-empty set of social roles; and
• T =    ri r j |ri r j ∈ R   = ∅ is a non-empty and weakly connected set of social
relationship types.
We now deﬁne a social structure as a role structure instantiated by agents.Formally,
we have the following deﬁnition:
Deﬁnition 5.3.A social structure SSti is a tuple  RS Agti , where:
• RS =  R T  is a role structure; and
• Agti =  ai a j     |∀ai∃ri ∈ R s.t. In ai r i  ti    = ∅ is a non-empty set of agents.
In a social structure, agents are weakly connected with one another through the
relations that exist among the roles that they occupy.However, the agents of a social
structure are not necessarily connected by social relationships (Section 4.4). In fact,
they might be unaware of each other.Therefore, if we want to derive a social construct
that describes the connections among the agents in terms of their social relationships,
we need to enrich the above notion of social structure with a cognitive component that
enables the agents to be aware of each other’s instantiation of related roles.To this
end, we now deﬁne the notion of social relationship structure as a social structure in
which the agents are not only weakly connected as a result of the connections among
the roles they occupy, but they are also aware of (some of) their connections.Formally,
we have:
Deﬁnition 5.4.A social relationship structure SRSti is a tuple  SSti Relti , where:
• SSti =  RS Agti  is a social structure; and
• Relti =    ai a j |∃  ri r j ∈T s.t. rel ai a j  ri r j   ti ;ai a j ∈ Ag   = ∅ is a non-
empty and weakly connected set of pairs of agents that, at time ti, are related to each
other through social relationships.
In a social relationship structure, agents are weakly connected with one another,
structurally through the relations that exist among the roles that they occupy, and cog-
nitively through the mutual beliefs concerning each other’s occupying related roles.762 Computational Intelligence
However, even though in a social relationship structure agents are cognitively related
to one another, they do not necessarily impact upon one another’s mental state.In fact,
for example, they might well be able/willing/entitled to act in isolation and, therefore,
they might not need to exercise any form of social inﬂuence upon others’ mental states
and behaviours.Or, alternatively, they might autonomously decide not to let their men-
tal states and behaviours be affected by others’ social inﬂuence.In these circumstances,
the agents are not involved in social mental shaping processes and, therefore, they do
not modify their mental states by adopting socially motivated attitudes.Thus, if we
want to derive a social construct that reﬂects not only social relationships but also the
inter-agent cognitive connections resulting from the social inﬂuence that agents exert
upon one another, we need to couch the above notion of social relationship structure
in terms of social cognitive relationships (Krackhardt 1987).This leads to the following
deﬁnition of social cognitive structure:
Deﬁnition 5.5.A social cognitive structure SCSti is a tuple  SRSti Cognti , where:
• SRSti =  SSti Relti  is a social relationship structure; and
• Cognti =    ai a j |∃  ri r j ∈T s.t. cogn ai a j  ri r j   ti ;ai a j ∈ Relti   = ∅ is a
non-empty and weakly connected set of pairs of agents that, at time ti, are related to
one another through social cognitive relationships.
Even though every social cognitive structure is a social relationship structure,
nonetheless not every social relationship structure is a social cognitive structure.In fact,
as is shown in the deﬁnition above, for a social relationship structure to be a cognitive
structure, the agents must be weakly connected through a web of binary social cognitive
relationships.In this view, a social cognitive structure may be seen as an extension of
the concept of social cognitive relationship to those situations in which two or more
agents are involved in complex forms of social mental shaping.
6. AXIOMS FOR CONSISTENCY
Thus far, we have described agents as autonomous cognitive entities, engaged in an
iterated series of social actions and interactions aimed at completing their mental states.
In a multi-agent system, roles and social relationships provide the agents with socially
motivated mental attitudes that, when adopted, either replace or complement their
individually motivated ones.Thus, the agent’s mental state may be seen as constituted
of two main types of mental attitudes: (a) individually motivated attitudes; and (b)
socially motivated attitudes.In order for the agent to behave in a coherent and rational
manner, these attitudes must be consistent with each other (Cohen and Levesque 1990;
Rao and Georgeff 1991).In what follows, we shall brieﬂy introduce the main axioms
that underpin and govern consistency among socially motivated attitudes (Section 6.1)
and between these and individually motivated ones (Section 6.2).
6.1. Consistency Among Socially Motivated Mental Attitudes
When an agent is socially inﬂuenced to modify its mental state by adopting a set of
socially motivated mental attitudes, these attitudes must maintain a degree of consis-
tency, in compliance with the axioms governing the agent’s mental state (see Sections
4.2.1–4.2.4). As we mentioned in Sections 4.3.1.1–4.3.1.3, attached to roles may be men-
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therefore confronted with such problems as role ambiguity, incompatibility and over-
load.Furthermore, an agent could be playing a number of roles that may impose dif-
ferent expectations, inﬂuences and responsibilities, some of which may well conﬂict.In
order to behave rationally, the agent must overcome these inconsistencies by neglect-
ing and/or modifying some role-based attitudes and maintaining others.To model this,
we introduce a new set of axioms for consistency between socially motivated attitudes.
These axioms also hold in the following two situations: (a) the agent is subjected to a
number of social mental shaping processes outside of any social relationship and role
(Section 5.2.1); and (b) the agent is subjected to different forms of inﬂuence exercised
by another agent within a social relationship or, alternatively, it is involved in more
than one social relationship and, therefore, is subjected to the inﬂuence of different
acquaintances (Section 5.2.2). In either case, the agent may be induced by one or more
agents to adopt a number of attitudes, some of which may well conﬂict.For example,
an agent involved in two social relationships may be inﬂuenced by two other agents to
adopt two conﬂicting goals.The agent must overcome such inconsistency in order to
behave in a coherent and rational manner (see Section 4.2.3).
To model consistency between attitudes in the face of competing social inﬂuences,
a number of axioms are introduced.14 Note that these consistency axioms are similar
to those introduced in Sections 4.2.1–4.2.4, and so their justiﬁcation is similar. For
simplicity, AttS1 and AttS2 are used to indicate two socially motivated mental attitudes
that an agent may receive either from roles or from other agents (within or outside
social relationships).
A1) BelS1/BelS2
An agent’s socially motivated beliefs must not contradict each other.
[BB1] |= BelS1 ai    ti ⊃¬ BelS2 ai ¬   ti .
Theorem 6.1.An agent’s socially motivated beliefs must not contradict each other’s
implications:
|= BelS1 ai    ti ∧BelS1 ai    ⊃     ti ⊃¬ BelS2 ai ¬   ti 
Proof.Since beliefs are closed under consequence (axiom KB in Section 4.2.1), we
have: BelS1 ai    ti ∧BelS1 ai    ⊃     ti ⊃BelS1 ai    ti .Thus, by applying axiom
BB1, we have: BelS1 ai    ti ⊃¬ BelS2 ai ¬   ti .
A2) DesS1/DesS2
According to the axiomatisation given in Section 4.2.2, an agent’s desires need not be
consistent with each other.They simply need to be closed under consequence.There-
fore, like individually motivated desires, socially motivated ones may also contradict
each other.For example, an agent may be inﬂuenced by another agent to adopt the
desire to smoke, and at the same time emulate another agent by adopting its desire to
lead a healthy life.
  DesS1 ai    ti ⊃¬ DesS2 ai ¬   ti 
14In all the following axiom schemas, we will assume that the unbound variables are universally quantiﬁed
as follows: ∀ai ∈ DAg ∀ti ∈ DT ∀w ∈ W .In addition, in all the axiom schemas, we assume that   and   can be
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A3) GoalS1/GoalS2
An agent’s socially motivated goals must not contradict each other.
[GG1] |= GoalS1 ai    ti ⊃¬ GoalS2 ai ¬   ti .
Theorem 6.2.An agent’s socially motivated goals must not contradict each other’s
implications:
|= GoalS1 ai    ti ∧GoalS1 ai    ⊃     ti ⊃¬ GoalS2 ai ¬   ti 
Proof.Since goals are closed under consequence (axiom KG in Section 4.2.3), we have:
GoalS1 ai    ti ∧  GoalS1 ai    ⊃     ti ⊃GoalS1 ai    ti .Thus, by applying
axiom GG1, we have: GoalS1 ai    ti ⊃¬ GoalS2 ai ¬   ti .
A4) GoalS1/BelS2
As goals are governed by the weak realism constraint (axiom G1 in Section 4.2.3), an
agent’s socially motivated goals must not contradict its socially motivated beliefs.For
example, if an agent adopts the role-based goal that   will be eventually true, then the
agent must not be socially inﬂuenced by another agent to adopt the belief that   will
be always false.
[GB1] |= GoalS1 ai    ti ⊃¬ BelS2 ai ¬   ti 
A5) IntS1/IntS2
Socially motivated intentions must not contradict each other.
[II1] |= IntS1 ai    ti ⊃¬ IntS2 ai ¬   ti 
Theorem 6.3.An agent’s socially motivated intentions must not contradict each other’s
implications:
|= IntS1 ai    ti ∧IntS1 ai    ⊃     ti ⊃¬ IntS2 ai ¬   ti 
Proof.Since intentions are closed under consequence (axiom KI in Section 4.2.4), we
have: IntS1 ai    ti ∧IntS1 ai    ⊃     ti ⊃IntS1 ai    ti .Thus, by applying axiom
II1, we have: IntS1 ai    ti ⊃¬ IntS2 ai ¬   ti .
A6) IntS1/BelS2
As with goals, socially motivated intentions must not contradict socially motivated
beliefs (see axiom I1 in Section 4.2.4).
[IB1] |= IntS1 ai    ti ⊃¬ BelS2 ai ¬   ti 
6.2. Consistency Between Individually and Socially Motivated Attitudes
When an agent is subjected to a social mental shaping process, the mental attitudes
it adopts must be consistent with the agent’s individually motivated attitudes.These
consistency relations are governed by the following group of axioms.For simplicity, with
AttI and AttS we indicate, respectively, an agent’s individually and socially motivated
mental attitude.
B1) BelI/BelS
An agent’s individually motivated beliefs must not contradict its socially motivated
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[BB2] |= BelI ai    ti ⊃¬ BelS ai ¬   ti 
[BB3] |= BelS ai    ti ⊃¬ BelI ai ¬   ti 
Theorem 6.4.An agent’s individually and socially motivated beliefs must not contradict
each other’s implications:
|= BelI ai    ti ∧BelI ai    ⊃     ti ⊃¬ BelS ai ¬   ti 
|= BelS ai    ti ∧BelS ai    ⊃     ti ⊃¬ BelI ai ¬   ti 
Proof.It follows from axiom KB (Section 4.2.1) and axioms BB2 and BB3.
B2) DesI/DesS
From the axiomatisation given in Section 4.2.2, it follows that an agent’s individually
and socially motivated desires need not be consistent with each other.
  DesI ai    ti ⊃¬ DesS ai ¬   ti 
  DesS ai    ti ⊃¬   DesI ai ¬   ti 
B3) GoalI/GoalS
An agent’s individually and socially motivated goals must not contradict each other.
[GG2] |= GoalI ai    ti ⊃¬ GoalS ai ¬   ti 
[GG3] |= GoalS ai    ti ⊃¬ GoalI ai ¬   ti 
Theorem 6.5.An agent’s individually and socially motivated goals must not contradict
each other’s implications:
|= GoalI ai    ti ∧GoalI ai    ⊃     ti ⊃¬ GoalS ai ¬   ti 
|= GoalS ai    ti ∧GoalS ai    ⊃     ti ⊃¬ GoalI ai ¬   ti 
Proof.It follows from axiom KG (Section 4.2.3) and axioms GG2 and GG3.
B4) BelI/GoalS
As goals are governed by the weak realism constraint (axiom GI in Section 4.2.3), an
agent’s socially motivated goals must not contradict its individually motivated beliefs.
For example, if an agent has a socially motivated goal that   will eventually be true,
then it must not have an individually motivated belief that   will always be false.
[GB2] |= GoalS ai    ti ⊃¬ BelI ai ¬   ti 
B5) GoalI/BelS
Similarly, an agent’s individually motivated goals must not contradict its socially moti-
vated beliefs.
[GB3] |= GoalI ai    ti ⊃¬ BelS ai ¬   ti 
B6) IntI/IntS
An agent’s individually and socially motivated intentions must not contradict each other.
[II2] |= IntI ai    ti ⊃¬ IntS ai ¬   ti 
[II3] |= IntS ai    ti ⊃¬ IntI ai ¬   ti 766 Computational Intelligence
Theorem 6.6.An agent’s individually and socially motivated intentions must not con-
tradict each other’s implications:
|= IntI ai    ti ∧IntI ai    ⊃     ti ⊃¬ IntS ai ¬   ti 
|= IntS ai    ti ∧IntS ai    ⊃     ti ⊃¬ IntI ai ¬   ti 
Proof.It follows from axiom KI (Section 4.2.4) and axioms II2 and II3.
B7) IntI/BelS
Like with goals, an agent’s individually motivated intentions must not contradict its
socially motivated beliefs (see weak realism constraint II in Section 4.2.4).
[IB2] |= IntI ai    ti ⊃¬ BelS ai ¬   ti 
B8) BelI/IntS
Similarly, an agent’s socially motivated intentions must not contradict its individually
motivated beliefs.
[IB3] |= IntS ai    ti ⊃¬ BelI ai ¬   ti 
The axioms that have been presented so far govern the agent’s social mental shaping
by imposing a degree of consistency on its mental state.When an agent is involved in
a number of social actions and interactions, it is expected to make a range of decisions
about which attitudes to adopt or to keep and which to abandon and/or modify.On
the one hand, when confronted with mandatory socially motivated attitudes (Sections
4.3 and 5.2.2), the agent must adopt them and then decide which are the competing
attitudes to be dropped and/or modiﬁed.On the other, when confronted with optional
socially motivated attitudes, the agent is expected to select which of the competing
attitudes is to be maintained.Accordingly, all the other conﬂicting attitudes will be
dropped and/or modiﬁed.This decision can be based either on the agent’s preference
function or on a domain-dependent inﬂuence function (Cavedon and Sonenberg 1998).
Thus, an agent may just locally decide to prefer one attitude among a set of competing
ones.Or, alternatively, an attitude may be considered the most important and inﬂuential
to an agent among a set of conﬂicting ones.This is an important issue that we leave for
further investigation.
It now remains to discuss the primary forms of social cognitive relationships (see
Deﬁnition 5.1 in Section 5.2.2; and Section 7), and to give some indications con-
cerning the application of our model to structuring and analysing multi-agent systems
(Section 8).
7. FORMS OF SOCIAL COGNITIVE RELATIONSHIPS
To illustrate the power and ﬂexibility of the concept of social mental shaping, in
this section a number of fundamental forms of social cognitive relationships will be
introduced and examined by showing how they ﬁt within the conceptual and formal
framework.The chosen forms are fundamental in the sense that they represent the
main ways in which social mental shaping may take place within social relationships
between agents.Also, the chosen forms of social cognitive relationships underpin a
wide variety of social phenomena, such as cooperation, negotiation and collaborative
decision-making.Note that, for simplicity, the focus will be restricted to social relation-
ships and the varying forms of social mental shaping that take place within them, even
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7.1. Imitation
Imitation is a form of social mental shaping grounded on desires.In this view,
imitation takes place as long as agent ai believes that another agent aj has a desire
towards  , and this motivates ai to adopt or to keep such a desire towards  .Formally,
we have:
∀ai aj ∀tiImit ai aj    ti ≡∃ ri rj  s.t. Infl Des ai    rel ai aj  ri rj    ti 
For example, the relationship between husband and wife may be such that they are
mutually inﬂuenced to adopt each other’s desires, perhaps in an effort to contribute to
each other’s happiness.In this view, they imitate each other.Imitation may occur mainly
as a result of a variety of reasons related to love, friendship, mutual trust, or empathy.
It refers to the spontaneous adoption of others’ innermost psychological attributes and
inclinations (Coleman 1990).More generally, imitation may take place either outside of
any social relationship or within social relationships based on emotional (e.g. friendship)
or normative exchange (e. g.authority relations) (Mitchell 1973).For example, should
two agents be involved in a normative exchange, one of them, perhaps affected by the
other’s charm or social status, may spontaneously imitate and adopt some of the latter’s
desires.
7.2. Adoption
We call adoption that form of social mental shaping that refers to goals.Formally,
we have:
∀ai aj ∀tiAdopt ai aj    ti ≡∃ ri rj  s.t. Infl Goal ai    rel ai aj  ri rj    ti  
For example, a salesman may adopt the goal of selling ten life insurance policies
in a week because he believes that a rival salesman in the same company has the same
goal.As a result of the competition between the two salesmen, therefore, the former
adopts the latter’s goal.From a more general perspective, adoption is a key form of
social mental shaping that lies at the heart of a variety of social phenomena ranging
from competitive to cooperative forms of social behaviour (Coleman 1990).On the
one hand, like in the example above, an agent may be strategically inﬂuenced to adopt
another’s goal based on its own behavioural tactics suited to competitive environments
(e. g.markets or negotiation processes) (Faratin et al.1998).On the other, an agent’s
adoption of another’s goal may be regarded as a pro-social behaviour leading to forms of
joint cooperative activities (e. g.collaborative decision-making) (Panzarasa et al.2001a).
Furthermore, in social sciences, adoption has been conceptualised both in terms of
spontaneous internalisation of others’ goals and in terms of the effects that others’
behaviours and/or expectations may have upon an agent’s mental state (Baron et al.
1992).Firstly, an agent may spontaneously adopt another’s goal as a result of variety
of reasons related to emotional exchange (love, friendship, trust, pity, altruism and so
forth).In such circumstances, adoption may be mainly regarded as a benevolent form
of social mental shaping, whereby an agent adopts another’s goal simply for the welfare
of the latter.However, there are also circumstances in which goal adoption can be seen
as a selﬁsh form of social mental shaping that is instrumental to the achievement of
individual intentions/goals.For example, should adoption be the inferential conclusion
of an agent’s practical reasoning regarding how to achieve some selﬁsh ends, then it
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agent’s non-altruistic intentions (Panzarasa et al.2001a).Secondly, goal adoption may
occur as a result of an agent’s request or simply as a result of an agent’s intention to
impact upon another’s mental state.15 In such cases, unlike spontaneous forms of goal
adoption, an agent is induced to change its mental state by external pressures towards
conformity to others’ mental states (Baron et al.1992).Most of the time, an agent’s
goal adoption induced by another’s (explicit or implicit) request is instrumental to the
achievement of (some of) the latter’s intentions/goals.
7.3. Adhesion
Adhesion is that form of social mental shaping that is grounded on intentions: an
agent may be motivated to hold an intention by the fact that it believes that another
agent has that intention.Formally, we have:
∀ai a j  ∀ti Adhes ai a j    ti ≡∃  ri r j  s.t. Infl Int ai     rel ai a j  ri r j    ti 
For example, a secretary may adopt the intention that a report is completed by some
deadline because he or she believes that his or her boss has this intention.In this view,
the secretary adheres to the boss’s intention.In this example, the secretary, by adhering
to the boss’s intention, will eventually behave in such a way that the intention will be
fulﬁlled and the report completed by the deadline.In this case, the secretary’s adhesion
may be motivated by the intention that the boss’s intentions are fulﬁlled.However, there
may be also forms of adhesion that are simply induced by trust, respect, loyalty, etc.,
and therefore are unrelated to the intention that the other party achieves his or her own
intentions.For example, the secretary may adopt his or her boss’s intentions simply as
a result of the former’s conﬁdence in the latter’s expertise or, alternatively, the former’s
sensitivity about the latter’s high social status.In these cases, the secretary may adopt
the boss’s intentions even though the former believes that the latter can fulﬁll his or her
intentions in isolation, regardless of any assistance that others can provide.In turn, in
these circumstances, the secretary’s adhesion may be instrumental to the achievement
of his or her selﬁsh intentions/goals.
More generally, adhesion, like goal adoption, can be either benevolent or selﬁsh
(Coleman 1990).On the one hand, benevolent adhesion means that an agent adheres
to another’s intention because the former intends to contribute to the latter’s welfare
by fulﬁlling its intention.On the other, selﬁsh adhesion means that an agent adheres
to another’s intention simply in order to have its own selﬁsh intentions/goals fulﬁlled.
Furthermore, like goal adoption, adhesion can be either spontaneous or motivated by
others’ requests (Baron et al.1992; Milgram 1974).However, unlike goal adoption,
adhesion can take place as a result not only of others’ requests but also of the authority
that an agent can exercise over another.In this case, when adhesion is intertwined
with authority relations, an agent is obliged by another to internalise and adopt a
relationship-based mandatory intention (Coleman 1990) (see Section 5.2.2). Typically,
15Note that an agent cannot be obliged by another to adopt a goal as a result of the authority that the latter
can exercise over the former.The main reason why, unlike adhesion (see Section 7. 3), goal adoption cannot be
regarded as prescriptive (e.g. based on agents’ authority/power) is that the only way to determine whether or not
norms, prescriptions, rules and commands are being followed is to observe the agents’ behaviour.Since in our
formalisation goals are only loosely related to behaviour (see Section 4.2.3), and since agents’ mental states are
not observable entities, it would be impossible to determine whether or not an agent has adopted a goal (Clark
1998).As a result, a norm or an authority relation that relies on goal adoption would be mainly ineffective and
fairly easy to escape.The same considerations also explain why only role-based intentions, and not goals, reﬂect
the rules, norms, etc. that govern a multi-agent system (see Section 4.3.1).Social Mental Shaping 769
adhesion to mandatory intentions is a normative form of social mental shaping that
refers to the inﬂuence caused by the (explicit or implicit) rewards and punishments that
an agent controls and to which another agent is subject (Baron et al.1992).
7.4. Exploitation
In general, agents will neither store nor process information in costly ways when
they can use their social environment as a convenient stand-in for the information-
processing operations concerned.Particularly, within certain social relationships, it is
often the case that an agent can easily lean on the information possessed by another
agent to get the job done.In such cases, the agent extends its own mental state so as
to include the other agent’s beliefs.And such a mental extension is just based on the
agent’s belief that the other agent has a belief.Such a form of social mental shaping is
here referred to as exploitation.Formally, we have:
∀ai a j  ∀ti Expl ai a j    ti ≡∃  ri r j  s.t. Infl Bel ai     rel ai a j  ri r j    ti  
Again, an example may help understand the meaning of the deﬁnition above.Fred,
the muscle of a two person delivery team, may believe that there is a delivery schedule
for the day because he believes that Ann, the van driver, has the schedule—and hence
believes there to be a schedule.In fact, Fred may not have seen today’s schedule (col-
lecting and following the day’s schedule is Ann’s responsibility), but he comes to adopt
this belief as a result of his relationship with Ann.Furthermore, and more interestingly,
as Fred knows that Ann has the schedule, he also knows that, when necessary, he can
rely on Ann to get the content of it and any further detail.In this view, Fred does not
need to overload his mental state with the information owned by Ann.Simply, based on
his relationship with her, Fred knows that, when necessary, he can exploit Ann’s belief,
and thus he can reduce the cognitive effort required to get his job done.In cognitive
sciences, this form of social mental shaping is often described as reﬂecting a conception
of the agent’s mental state as escaping its “natural” conﬁnes and mingling with the phys-
ical and social environment (Clark 1998; Hutchins 1995).From a different perspective,
in social and organisational sciences, exploitation is mainly regarded as related to such
form of organisational memory often referred to as “transactive memory” (Carley 1990;
Wegner 1987).This notion refers to the fact that agents, based on their interrelation-
ships, develop a shared system for encoding, storing and retrieving information from
different substantive domains.In this view, it is suggested that, drawing on their net-
work deﬁned in terms of “who knows who knows what,” agents can exploit each other’s
beliefs and thus contribute to the system’s performance by enhancing its efﬁciency and
effectiveness (Wegner 1987).
8. SOCIAL MENTAL SHAPING IN CONTEXT
Having developed a formalisation of social mental shaping, it is now interesting to
give some general indications as to how this formalisation can be used in multi-agent
system research, both for theoretical and practical purposes.To this end, in this Section
the model of social mental shaping will be applied to an extended example from a real-
world domain, and it will be placed in the broader context of negotiation and practical
reasoning in multi-agent systems (see Panzarasa et al.(2001b) for details).770 Computational Intelligence
The domain of interest here is the sale of a privately held company through the pub-
lic offering of shares to relatively small investors and, possibly, through the involvement
of an active investor.On the one hand, small investors are passive potential share-
holders with virtually no monitoring capabilities.On the other, an active investor is
an individual or group that is interested in investing in the company by purchasing a
controlling interest and by bringing expertise or other resources to the ﬁrm.Finally,
the selling agent (i.e., the representative of the company concerned) can be seen as
motivated by the intention that shares in the company are sold, and through this, by
the intention to release the maximum amount of revenue.
Building on Mello and Parsons (1998), four distinct strategies can be identiﬁed that
may be used by the seller of shares in a privately held company.These are:
1.To search for an active investor, attempt to establish a price for the sale of a con-
trolling block with that investor, and then offer the remainder of the shares to small
investors (“Sequential 1”).
2.To offer shares to small investors, but retain a controlling block to be subsequently
offered to an active investor (“Sequential 2”).
3.To negotiate with an active investor and simultaneously to offer shares to the small
investors (“Parallel”).
4.To sell all shares to small investors at a uniform price, without any attempt to involve
an active investor (“Public Offering”).
Each strategy reﬂects different patterns of social cognitive relationships between the
agents involved.In order to examine these relationships, prototype agents representing
the seller, the active investor and the small investors have been implemented using
UM-PRS (Lee et al.1994)—an implementation of the Procedural Reasoning System
(Georgeff and Lansky 1987).Each selling strategy is speciﬁed as a “Knowledge Area”
(KA), or predetermined plan.The details of these KAs are not relevant to this paper,
but the strategy selected by the selling agent may have an impact on the mental shaping
that can be exerted during the enactment of the strategy.
In the ﬁrst three strategies, establishing a relationship with a potential active inves-
tor is essential.It is important for the selling agent to identify an active investor that
will, in principle, be prepared to purchase a controlling share in the company.Should
an acceptable price be agreed upon, the active investor will commit itself to pay that
price for a controlling interest in the ﬁrm.Purchasing a controlling interest in the ﬁrm
is a goal of the active investor’s and is a candidate for being moved to intention status.
The question remains: where does this goal come from? In its simplest form, the goal
may be internally generated by the active investor, regardless of any relations with other
agents.However, the model described in this paper provides for an alternative answer:
the relationship established between the selling agent and the active investor can be
regarded as a social cognitive relationship in which the active investor adopts the goal
of the selling agent to have a controlling interest in the ﬁrm sold:
Adopt active-investor selling-agent has active-investor controlling-interest  
The establishment of this relationship, and the related goal adoption by the active
investor, will enable the selling agent to pursue one of the ﬁrst three strategies.How-
ever, this is not the only social cognitive relationship that can be established between
the selling agent and the active investor.Indeed, there are other forms of social cogni-
tive relationships that are more closely related to the agreement as to the price at which
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an assessment of an acceptable price for shares in the ﬁrm.The “book-value” of a ﬁrm
reﬂects the turnover and the assets of the company, and is information in the public
domain.Furthermore, the active investor may bring further assets to the company in
the form of expertise or other resources; this will tend to lower the price paid per share
by the active investor, and is often referred to as the discount (Mello and Parsons 1998).
Having a controlling interest in the company will also bring private beneﬁts to the active
investor; this will tend to raise the price paid per share, and is often referred to as the
premium (Mello and Parsons 1998).It is in the interests of the active investor that the
selling agent is aware of those assets that the active investor will bring to the company.
Therefore, it is in the interests of the active investor to establish a relationship with the
selling agent in which the active investor can inﬂuence the selling agent to believe that
further assets will be brought to the ﬁrm:
Expl selling-agent active-investor has-asset  active-investor ?asset  
Similarly, a social cognitive relationship may be established in which the active
investor is inﬂuenced to exploit a belief of the selling agent’s.Consider strategy
“Sequential 2”: the selling agent offers shares to the small investors, but retains a con-
trolling share to be offered to the active investor.Even though, initially, the market
value of the ﬁrm can only be estimated using the book-value, nonetheless after the sale
of a minority stake to various small investors, the selling agent can gain a better estimate
of the market value of shares in the company.Now, once the seller has gathered this
new piece of information, it may be interested in making the active investor update its
beliefs about the market value of shares.To this end, a social cognitive relationship can
be established in which the active investor is inﬂuenced by the selling agent to exploit
the latter’s beliefs:
Expl active-investor selling-agent market-value ?value  
These patterns of social cognitive relationships are now used to undertake a set
of virtual experiments with simulated data.In particular, we will examine whether and
to what extent the choice of a selling strategy can impact upon the negotiating agents’
mental states and, ultimately, upon the generation of an agreement and the perfor-
mance of a going public process.Since each selling strategy reﬂects different forms
of social cognitive relationships, this study will enable us also to examine the impact
that social cognitive relationships and social mental shaping can have upon the per-
formance of joint behavioural processes.In this respect, an interesting interpretation
and comparison of the selling strategies in terms of their underpinning social cognitive
relationships can be as follows.With strategy “Sequential 1,” the seller tries to impact
upon the active investor’s mental state by offering him or her a price with no additional
information, and then approaches the small investors and inﬂuences them by offer-
ing a price and letting them know whether or not a controlling block has been sold.
With strategy “Sequential 2,” the seller impacts on the small investors’ mental states by
offering them a price with no additional information, and then impacts upon the active
investor’s mental state by offering a price and letting him or her know whether or not
shares have been sold to the small investors.A variant of strategy “Sequential 2” can
be introduced, namely “Strategy 2 + Inﬂuence”, which differs from the former in that
the seller tries to exert social inﬂuence more convincingly upon the active investor by
providing him or her with more detailed information on which the price being offered
is made contingent (e. g.the price already established with other investors).As a result
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Figure 1.Revenue released from the sale of shares at different concession rates and using dif-
ferent selling strategies.
and act accordingly than would be the case if the seller had forwarded only a price
without any further information that might justify it.With strategy “Parallel,” the seller
impacts simultaneously upon both the active investor’s and the small investors’ men-
tal states, by letting them know about the parallel negotiation processes.Finally, with
strategy “Public Offering,” the seller approaches and inﬂuences the small investors only
with a price and no further information.
Figure 1 illustrates the revenue released from the sale of the ﬁrm as the degree of
ﬂexibility of the selling agent changes when different strategies are used.The seller’s
ﬂexibility is modelled as a concession rate reﬂecting the degree to which the seller will
deviate from his or her ideal share price during negotiation.As is shown in Figure 1,
strategies “Sequential 1” and “Sequential 2” perform poorly if the seller uses low con-
cession rates during negotiation.An interpretation of these results is that, when estab-
lishing the share price with the active investor (in “Sequential 1”) or the small investors
(in “Sequential 2”), the seller gains information about the value of shares in the com-
pany.This information may bias the price that the seller may expect to receive during
subsequent negotiation with the small investors (in “Sequential 1”) or the active investor
(in “Sequential 2”).This increased expectation of reward along with inﬂexibility may
imply that the seller is unable to establish a share price with the small investors when
using strategy “Sequential 1” and with the active investor when using strategy “Sequen-
tial 2.” However, should strategy “Sequential 2 + Inﬂuence” be adopted, the seller may
risk a less ﬂexible strategy during negotiation to obtain a higher revenue.In fact, with
this strategy, the seller inﬂuences the active investor by communicating an additional
piece of information so as to justify the offer made.In turn, a greater amount of infor-
mation makes social mental shaping more effective, and ultimately helps the seller to
obtain higher revenue.Another result that is evident from Figure 1 is that, at medium
and high concession rates, a public offering of all shares at a uniform price is associated
with the worst performance.In such situations, a sequential sale is more effective as it
allows the seller to obtain more information on which subsequent social mental shaping
can be made contingent and thus more effectively exerted.
These preliminary experiments clearly illustrate how our model of social men-
tal shaping can be used to investigate different social cognitive relationships betweenSocial Mental Shaping 773
agents, and how these relationships affect the behaviour of the agents involved.By
viewing interactions in terms of inﬂuence processes, we abstract away from the speciﬁcs
of any particular algorithm for cooperation, coordination or negotiation.Thus, our
framework enables an application designer to concentrate on the essence and cogni-
tive foundations of inter-agent social interactions, without worrying about how these
relationships can actually be enacted.In this sense, the model is also a useful tool in
the development and understanding of practical applications of multi-agent systems.
9. RELATED WORK
While BDI architectures conceptualise intentional behaviour, they say nothing about
the social aspects of agents being situated in a multi-agent system (see Section 2).On
the other hand, architectures for interacting agents have mainly focused on mechanisms
and structures for managing the coordination process and have paid less attention to
the agent’s decision-making apparatus.There are, however, a number of architectures
that attempt to incorporate both facets of agenthood into a single model (Cavedon et al.
1997; Lux and Steiner 1995).Such architectures are typically layered.They involve sep-
arate components for local decision-making and for social behaviour, combined within
a control framework that seeks to strike a balance between the two.Unfortunately, in
most cases, the link between the two main components is somewhat ad hoc in nature
and has no clear underpinning conceptual model.
By focusing on the problem of sociality among autonomous agents, this work can be
regarded as closely related to interaction-based architectures such as STEAM (Tambe
1997), GRATE* (Jennings 1995), and MECCA (Lux and Steiner 1995).However, our
work does not deal with the incorporation of cooperative abilities into an agent frame-
work through additional social constructs and operators (such as joint intentions and
common goals).Rather, we work within a standard BDI architecture and provide a the-
oretical model that extends BDI logic so as to account for sociality among autonomous
deliberative agents.In doing this, we broaden the set of an agent’s mental attitudes so
as to encompass not only internally motivated attitudes, but also socially motivated atti-
tudes that the agent adopts as a result of its being situated within a social environment.
Our approach has some commonality with models based on social commitment and
social attitudes (as discussed in Section 2).Castelfranchi (1995) states that both indi-
vidual commitment and collective commitment are internal commitments of either an
individual agent or a group of agents.Accordingly, he claims that we need a notion of
social commitment that captures the dependence relationships between agents.Cavedon
et al.(1997) introduce modalities corresponding to social attitudes.These concepts
reﬂect relations between two agents (or teams), with respect to a proposition, and are
modelled upon Castelfranchi’s notion of generic commitments to performing actions
of a given type.Thus, social attitudes turn out to be a useful means for incorporating
commitment-based social interactions within a BDI framework.However, our notion of
social mental shaping is more general, since it captures different forms of social interac-
tions that do not necessarily reﬂect any commitment between agents (e.g. spontaneous
help, and trust-based relations).In addition, our approach addresses the problem of how
roles impact upon an agent’s mental state, outside of any particular social relationship.
Our formal framework is informed by the work of Cavedon and Sonenberg (1998).
They use roles as an abstraction that enables the agent designer to model the sphere
of inﬂuence of one agent with respect to another.They associate goals with roles.This
enables them to express generic social commitment: whenever an agent adopts a role,774 Computational Intelligence
this involves a commitment to taking on the goal attached to that role.So conceived
of, roles provide a way to specify how the agent should balance competing obligations
from different relationships, and overcome the tensions between personal preferences
and social obligations.Our work extends Cavedon and Sonenberg’s approach, in that it
associates roles not only with goals but also with beliefs and intentions.In addition, we
formalise the impact that an instantiation of a relation between roles has on an agent’s
mental state.
Our use of roles is similar to that of Werner (1989), in that he also associates roles
with mental attitudes.Werner deﬁnes a role as a description of an abstract agent that
is endowed with state information, permissions, responsibilities, and values.When an
agent assumes a role, it internalises that role by adopting the mental attitudes that are
attached to it.Likewise, our notion of role structure is similar to Werner’s notion of
social structure, in that both notions refer to a set of interrelated social roles.However,
while Werner uses roles and social structure to develop a theory of social cooperation
for multi-agent systems, we go further than he does and refer to these notions to cover a
wider range of social inter-agent behaviour (e.g. social exchange, help, unilateral coop-
eration).Finally, our use of roles differs from that of Barbuceanu (1997), who associates
roles with functions in an organisation, as well as with obligations towards others.Our
deﬁnition of roles as a set of mental attitudes permits us to provide a uniﬁed framework
in which, at a more general level, we can investigate the inﬂuence that the role structure
has not only on the role-player’s goals and intentions, but also on its beliefs.
10. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
The aim of this paper was to investigate the impact that sociality has on an agent’s
mental state, and to show how this impact can be formalised within a BDI framework.
The term “social mental shaping” was introduced to refer to the phenomenon that
the mere social nature of agents affects, and thereby alters, their mental states, thus
motivating their behaviour.The process of social mental shaping may involve social
roles, social relationships, or it may take place outside of any role or relationship.Its
typical outcome is a modiﬁcation of the social agent’s mental state: the agent may
adopt new socially motivated mental attitudes, or it may be provided with new reasons
for keeping attitudes generated at an earlier stage.
Here, the focus has mainly been on that kind of social mental shaping that captures
the impact that both roles and social relationships have on an agent’s mental state.
To address this, the structure of a multi-agent system was modelled in terms of roles
and relations between roles.On the one hand, when an agent takes on a role, it may
adopt the mental attitudes that are attached to that role.On the other, when an agent
interacts with an acquaintance, it can be inﬂuenced by that agent to adopt or to keep
a mental attitude.The novelty of our particular use of roles and social relationships
rests on the fact that it allows us to capture important ingredients of sociality within a
BDI logic.Interacting and deliberative agents can thus be modelled in terms of both
their internally motivated mental attitudes, and the impact that other agents and the
role structure of a multi-agent system have on their mental states.Indeed, roles and
social relationships provide the agent with new socially motivated mental attitudes or
new reasons for keeping individually motivated ones.In order for the social agent to
behave in a coherent and rational manner, individually and socially motivated attitudes
must be consistent with each other.In this respect, we introduced the main axiomsSocial Mental Shaping 775
governing such consistency among attitudes.Finally, we concentrated on social cognitive
relationships, and some of the main forms of these relationships have been explored.
Future work involves the investigation of the issues of why and when social mental
shaping arises.Further attention also needs to be paid to how social mental shaping
develops over time.An interesting scenario involves the case where social mental shap-
ing is persistent for some time but is essentially dynamic.For example, an agent may
join a multi-agent system, adopt some socially motivated mental attitudes, but later
relinquish them by changing its role or dropping out of a social relationship.
Another important aspect of social mental shaping that deserves future investigation
is the issue of inconsistency.In Section 6 we introduced a number of axioms underpin-
ning consistency for attitudes.However, we need to study the conceptual mechanisms
underlying an autonomous agent’s behaviour when more than one role and/or social
relationship are involved.As different roles and social relationships may have different
impacts on the agent’s mental state and some of them may well conﬂict (Cavedon and
Sonenberg 1998), it is important to specify a local preference function in order for the
agent to decide how to overcome this inconsistency.Further, different roles and social
relationships may impose conﬂicting inﬂuences and responsibilities on the agent because
adopting a socially motivated mental attitude precludes the agent from adopting a com-
peting one.To model this, we need to investigate a domain-dependent inﬂuence function
that asserts what is more inﬂuential to an agent in a given situation.For example, one
relationship may be more inﬂuential as one of the involved agents has signiﬁcant control
or power over its acquaintance.Or, at a given time, one role may be more crucial to
an agent than any other role it may also be playing.This also involves the investigation
of decision theoretic techniques for imposing constraints on the agent’s inﬂuence func-
tion; for example, one role may be considered more critical than another if occupying
it brings about more utility to the role-player or the multi-agent system as a whole.
Moving on to the logic developed in this paper, there are a number of obvious areas
for future work.We seek to provide a more detailed account of the relations between
modalities expressing individually and socially motivated mental attitudes.Particularly,
our focus will be on the cognitive modelling of roles, and on the complex process by
which role-based attitudes are internalised by the role-player and tied to its internal
attitudes in the course of the social mental shaping process.Further, in our model we
have said nothing about socially motivated joint mental attitudes.For example, a group
of agents may be inﬂuenced by another group or by an individual agent to adopt a
joint attitude.Or, a group may adopt a joint attitude as a consequence of its members’
adopting role-based attitudes.Future work needs therefore to highlight the key steps of
the process in which individual agents’ socially motivated attitudes are meshed together
until a joint mental attitude ensues.
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APPENDIX: THE COMPLETE DEFINITION OF
THE FORMAL FRAMEWORK
This Appendix introduces the quantiﬁed multi-modal logic that has been devised
to formally express our model of social mental shaping.The logic is called L. L is
a many-sorted, ﬁrst-order, multi-modal language which both draws upon and extends
the work described in Bell (1995), Bell and Huang (1997), Cohen and Levesque (1990),
Panzarasa et al.(2001 a), Rao and Georgeff (1991), and Wooldridge and Jennings
(1999).16 The main feature of L is that it can be used for reasoning about agents,
roles, social relationships, and mental attitudes, with explicit reference to time points
and intervals. L is ﬁrst-order because if allows quantiﬁcation over terms.Furthermore,
it is multi-modal: it contains a set of modal operators, which allow to reason about and
represent the beliefs, desires, goals and intentions of agents.Finally, L is based on a
model of time that is linear.
The following sections are intended to detail the formal language L.Firstly, in
Section A, a syntax will be developed, with an account of the symbols, terms, and well-
formed formulae through which our model of social mental shaping has been expressed.
Secondly, in Section B, the semantics of the language will be deﬁned.
A1. SYNTAX
Deﬁnition 1.The language L contains the following symbols:
16Our use of time is consistent with Bell’s (1995) and Bell and Huang’s (1997) work.Our formalisation of
individual mental attitudes draws upon Cohen and Levesque (1990) and Rao and Georgeff (1991).Like Wooldridge
and Jennings’ language (1999), our logic contains a modality that expresses mutual beliefs.However, our language
extends the aforementioned formal frameworks in that it contains terms for reasoning about roles and relationships,
and it explicitly addresses the formalisation of socially motivated attitudes.The most signiﬁcant point of departure
is that our logic is based on a linear view of time, whereas Wooldridge and Jennings use a branching temporal
model.Social Mental Shaping 779
1.a countable set Const of constant symbols, the union of the pairwise disjoint sets
ConstT (time point constants), ConstI (interval constants), ConstAg (agent con-
stants), ConstRoles (role constants), ConstRelTypes (relationship type constants),
ConstO (other constants);
2.a countable set Var of variable symbols, the union of the mutually disjoint sets VarT,
VarI, VarAg, VarRoles, VarRelTypes, VarO;
3.a countable set Pred of predicate symbols—each symbol P ∈ Pred is associated with
a natural number called its arity, given by arity P ;
4.the operator symbols Bel, Des, Goal, Int, In, RoleBel, RoleGoal, RoleInt, ∈ and =;
5.the punctuation symbols “)”, “(”, “[”, “]”, and comma “,”.
Deﬁnition 2.A term is either a constant or a variable. The sort of a term is either
Ag, T, I, Roles, RelTypes,o rO.The terms of sort agent, time point, interval, role,
relationship type and object (the sets termAg termT termI termRoles termRelTypes and
termO, respectively) are deﬁned as follows:
• termS is the minimal set s.t. ConstS ∪ VarS ⊆ termS, where S ∈  Ag T Roles,
RelTypes O ;
•   u u  |u u  ∈ termT ∪VarI ⊆ termI
We denote by Var the set of all variables, by Const the set of all constants, and by
Terms the set of variables and constants.Note that we demand that a predicate P is
applied to arity P  terms.
Deﬁnition 3.The syntax of well-formed formulae ( wffs) of the language L is deﬁned
as follows:
• If t t  ∈ termT then  t<t   ∈wffs.
• If u1     u n ∈ Terms P ∈ Pred, and i ∈ termI then P u1     u n  i ∈wffs.
• If u u  ∈ Terms and i ∈ termI then  u = u   i ∈wffs.
• If a ∈ termAg r∈ termRoles and i ∈ termI then In a r  i ∈wffs.
• If a ∈ termAg  ∈ wffs, and i ∈ termI then Bel a    i ∈wffs.
• If a ∈ termAg  ∈ wffs, and i ∈ termI then Des a    i ∈wffs.
• If a ∈ termAg  ∈ wffs, and i ∈ termI then Goal a    i ∈wffs.
• If a ∈ termAg  ∈ wffs, and i ∈ termI then Int a    i ∈wffs.
• If r ∈ termRoles  ∈ wffs, and i ∈ termI then RoleBel r     i ∈wffs.
• If r ∈ termRoles  ∈ wffs, and i ∈ termI then RoleGoal r     i ∈wffs.
• If r ∈ termRoles  ∈ wffs, and i ∈ termI then RoleInt r     i ∈wffs.
• If     ∈ wffs then ¬  ∈ wffs and    ∨   ∈wffs.
• If S ∈  Ag T I Roles RelTypes O  x∈ VarS, and   ∈ wffs then ∃x  ∈ wffs.
Deﬁnition 4.Relations and functions on time points and intervals  t t  ∈ termT;i i  ∈
termI :
• t = t  ≡¬   t<t   ∧¬   t  <t  
• t ≤ t  ≡  t<t   ∨  t = t  
• min  t t    ≡ min t t  
• max  t t    ≡ max t t  
• i<i   ≡ max i  < max i  
• i = i  ≡ max i =max i  
• i ≤ i  ≡  i<i   ∨  i = i  
• i = i  ≡  min i =min i    ∧  max i =max i   
• i ⊂ i  ≡  min i =min i    ∧  max i  < max i   780 Computational Intelligence
• i ⊆ i  ≡  i ⊂ i  ∨  i = i  
• i + 1 ≡  min i +1 max i +1  if min i =max i   min i  max i +1  otherwise
A2. SEMANTICS
The purpose of the semantics is to assign some formal meaning to the syntactic
objects of the language.This section introduces the formal semantics of L.The seman-
tics are presented in three main parts: the ﬁrst deﬁnes a model structure for L, the
second gives the semantic rules for L, and the third presents the notions of validity and
satisﬁability for formulae of L.
It is assumed that the actual world w0 may be any of a set W of possible worlds.
DT is a set of time points.The worlds in W are thought of as possible worlds which
share a common ﬂow of time (DT r DT), where rDT ⊆ DT × DT. DI represents a set of
intervals that are deﬁned in terms of time points.
The world is populated by a non-empty set DAg of agents.Agents have beliefs,
desires, goals and intentions.The beliefs of an agent are given by a Belief-accessibility
relation B on W in the usual way. B maps agents, time and worlds to possible worlds
frames.For world w, agent a and interval i, the conditions on W Bel a i w  and R Bel a i w 
capture the idea that W Bel a i w  is the set of R Bel a i w -accessible worlds from w.Sim-
ilarly, we assume that the desires, goals and intentions of agents are given by, respec-
tively, Desire-, Goal-, and Intention-accessibility relations on W .
Finally, the world contains a set of objects, DO, a set of roles DRoles and a set of
relationship types, DRelTypes.Attached to roles are a number of mental attitudes.As
happens with agents’ beliefs, role-based beliefs are given by a Role-Belief-accessibility
relation on W . RB maps roles, time and worlds to possible worlds frames.For world w,
role r and interval i, the conditions on W RoleBel r i w  and R RoleBel r i w  capture the idea
that W RoleBel r i w  is the set of R RoleBel r i w -accessible worlds from w.Similarly, we
assume that the goals and intentions attached to roles are given by, respectively, Role-
Goal- and Role-Intention-accessibility relations on W .
Deﬁnition 5.The domain of quantiﬁcation, D,i sDAg∪DT∪DI∪DRoles∪DRelTypes∪DO.
The language thus allows quantiﬁcation over agents, time points, intervals, roles,
relationship types and objects.Note that D is ﬁxed for all worlds.
Deﬁnition 6.An interpretation for constants, V , is a sort-preserving bijection
V : Const → D.A variable assignment, g, is a sort-preserving bijection g: Var → D.
Deﬁnition 7.A model M is a structure:
 W  w0 D Ag D T r DT D I D Roles D RelTypes D O In B D G I RB R G R I v    
where:
• W is a non-empty set of possible worlds;
• w0 is a distinguished member of W ;
• DAg is a non-empty set of agents;
• DT is a non-empty set of time points;
• rDT ⊆ DT × DT;
• DI =    t t  |t t  ∈ DT  is a non-empty set of intervals;
• DRoles is a non-empty set of roles;
• DRelTypes ⊆ DRoles × DRoles is a non-empty set of relationship types:   r  r   |r  r   ∈
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• DO is a non-empty set of objects;
• In ⊆ DAg × DRoles × DI × W ;
• B: DAg × DI × W → W ×  W × W   is such that:
1.for   =  a i w  B =  W Bel    R  Bel     is centred at w, that is w ∈ W Bel   ,
and  w  w  ∈R Bel    for any w   = w in W Bel   ;
2. R Bel    is serial, transitive, and euclidean;
• D: DAg × DI × W → W ×  W × W   is such that for   =  a i w , D  =
 W Des    R  Des     is centred at w, that is w ∈ W Des   , and  w  w  ∈R Des    for
any w   = w in W Des   ;
• G: DAg × DI × W → W ×  W × W   is such that:
1.for   =  a i w , G  =  W Goal    R  Goal     is centred at w, that is w ∈
W Goal   , and  w  w  ∈R Goal    for any w   = w in W Goal   ;
2. R Goal    is serial;
3. R Goal    ∩ R Bel     = ∅;
• I: DAg × DI × W → W ×  W × W   is such that:
1.for   =  a i w  I =  W Int    R  Int     is centred at w, that is w ∈ W Int   , and
 w  w  ∈R Int    for any w   = w in W Int   ;
2. R Int    is serial;
3. R Int    ∩ R Bel     = ∅;
• RB: DRoles × DI × W → W ×  W × W   is such that for   =  r i w , RB  =
 W RoleBel r  R  RoleBel r   is centred at w, that is w ∈ W RoleBel r , and  w  w  ∈
R RoleBel r  for any w   = w in W RoleBel r .
• RG: DRoles × DI × W → W ×  W × W   is such that for   =  r i w , RG  =
 W RoleGoal r  R  RoleGoal r   is centred at w, that is w ∈ W RoleGoal r , and  w  w  ∈
R RoleGoal r  for any w   = w in W RoleGoal r .
• RI: DRoles × DI × W → W ×  W × W   is such that for   =  r i w , RI  =
 W RoleInt r  R  RoleInt r   is centred at w, that is w ∈ W RoleInt r , and  w  w  ∈
R RoleInt r  for any w   = w in W RoleInt r .
• v: Const → D is an interpretation function for constants; and ﬁnally
•  : Pred × W →

n∈N Dn is a function which gives the extension of each predicate
symbol in each world, such that ∀P ∈ Pred, ∀n ∈ N, ∀w ∈ W ,i farity P =n, then
  P  w ⊆Dn, i.e.,   preserves arity.
Deﬁnition 8.Let g be a variable assignment, and let v be deﬁned as above.Then the
term valuation function Vg is deﬁned as follows:
• Vg   =      for   ∈ Const;
• Vg   =g     for   ∈ Var;
• Vg   =  Vg u  Vg u     for   =  u u  ∈termI.
The semantics of the language are deﬁned via the satisfaction relation, which holds
between interpretation structures and formulae of the language.An interpretation struc-
ture is a triple  M  w  g , where M is a model, w is a world, and g is a variable assign-
ment.The rules deﬁning the satisfaction relation are given in Deﬁnition 10.
Deﬁnition 9.A formula   is true at a world w in M (written M, w     if   is
satisﬁed by all assignments g at w.If a formula   is valid (satisﬁed by all interpretation
structures), we write   , as usual.782 Computational Intelligence
Deﬁnition 10.A variable assignment g satisﬁes a formula   at a world w in a model
M =  W  w0 D Ag D T r DT D I D Roles D RelTypes D O In B D G I RB R G R I, v,   ,
written M  w  g   , as follows.
• M  w  g  true
• M  w  g  t<t   iff  Vg t  V g t    ∈ rDT
• M  w  g  P u1     u n  i  iff  Vg u1      V g un   ∈    P  w  V g i  
• M  w  g   u1 = u2  i  iff Vg u1 =Vg u2 
• M  w  g  In a r  i  iff  Vg a  V g r  V g i  w ∈In
• M  w  g  Bel a    i  iff   =  Vg a  V g i  w  B  =  W Bel a  R  Bel a  
and M  w  g   for all  w  w  ∈R Bel a 
• M  w  g  Des a    i  iff   =  Vg a  V g i  w , D  =  W Des a  R  Des a  
and M  w  g   for all  w  w  ∈R Des a 
• M  w  g  Goal a    i  iff   =  Vg a  V g i  w , G  =  W Goal a  R  Goal a  
and M  w  g   for all  w  w  ∈R Goal a 
• M  w  g  Int a    i  iff   =  Vg a  V g i  w , I  =  W Int a  R  Int a  
and M  w  g   for all  w  w  ∈R Int a 
• M  w  g  RoleBel r     i  iff   =  Vg r  V g i  w ,
RB  =  W RoleBel r  R  RoleBel r  
and M  w  g   for all  w  w  ∈R RoleBel r 
• M  w  g  RoleGoal r     i  iff   =  Vg r  V g i  w ,
RG  =  W RoleGoal r  R  RoleGoal r  
andM  w  g   forall w  w  ∈R RoleGoal r 
• M  w  g  RoleInt r     i  iff   =  Vg r  V g i  w ,
RI  =  W RoleInt r  R  RoleInt r  
and M  w  g   for all  w  w  ∈R RoleInt r 
• M  w  g  ¬  iff M  w  g    
• M  w  g    ∨   iff M  w  g    or M  w  g   
• M  w  g  ∃x  iff M  w  g     for some g  differing from g
at most on x